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INTRODUCTION 
ebbie, a call girl, agrees to meet a new customer, Victor, 
at the Shady Acres Motel for dancing and a massage.1  
They retire to a motel room, but once there, Victor demands an 
entirely different act from Debbie, one in which she does not 
want to participate.  Debbie gathers her belongings and tries to 
leave, but Victor escalates his demands by becoming aggressive.  
He blocks the doorway, grabs Debbie’s blouse, and attempts to 
pull her towards him.  She slaps him and scratches his cheek, 
causing him to break his grip on her blouse.  He threatens to 
break her neck.  She screams and retreats from him.  He grabs a 
chair and swings it at her, barely missing her head.  Debbie 
retreats again, this time to a corner of the room, across the bed 
from Victor.  In a panic, she rummages through her purse and 
finds the switchblade she carries for self-defense.  She pulls it 
out, waves it at him, and warns him to stay away.  Threatening to 
crush her skull, Victor lunges across the bed towards her, chair 
in hand.  As he raises the chair overhead, she plunges the knife 
into his neck, severing his carotid artery.  The chair slips from his 
grasp onto the floor.  Victor bleeds to death on the bed, right in 
front of Debbie.  When the police arrive, Debbie, shaken, has 
just one thing to say:  “I killed him.  I can’t believe I killed him.” 
Victor’s body shows signs of a struggle:  a slap mark, scratches 
on his face, and a fatal knife wound to the neck.  Debbie, in 
contrast, has no visible marks or injuries.  The disordered 
condition of the room yields few clues about the nature of the 
struggle between Debbie and Victor.  The authorities do not 
believe Debbie’s subsequent claim of self-defense, and she is 
charged with second-degree murder and felony possession of a 
dangerous weapon. 
Debbie and Victor both have reputations “for violence” 
within their respective communities.  Debbie has a hot temper 
and has committed a number of petty assaults (kicking, 
scratching, etc.) against co-workers and members of her 
household.  She once kicked a police officer in the kneecap while 
being arrested.  In contrast, Victor’s violence has been severe 
and always directed against women.  Each violent act was 
 
1 The facts of this hypothetical are loosely based on facts from two cases:  
Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2005) and Williams v. Lord, 996 
F.2d 1481 (2d Cir. 1993). 
D
 736 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 733 
preceded by a rejected demand for a particular type of sexual 
activity.  Debbie’s defense attorney learns about these incidents 
while preparing for trial.  The attorney wants to use the incidents 
as evidence of Victor’s violent character to support a claim that 
Victor was the first aggressor in his fatal encounter with Debbie. 
Debbie’s only hope at trial is for the jury to believe she acted 
in self-defense.  Without eyewitnesses or supporting forensic 
evidence, however, her proof options are limited; it is her word 
against the undeniable reality of a dead victim.  Her ability to 
present an effective defense depends to a great extent on the 
jurisdiction’s approach to character evidence rules.  
Unfortunately for Debbie, if she is in either federal court or the 
majority of American criminal jurisdictions, character evidence 
rules will hinder the effective presentation of her self-defense 
claim at trial. 
In homicide and assault cases, many American criminal 
jurisdictions permit a defendant to introduce evidence that the 
alleged victim had a violent character.2  The purpose of this 
evidence is to establish the probability that the alleged victim 
was the first aggressor, which triggers the defendant’s right of 
self-defense.3  While character evidence is a potentially useful 
tool to assist the jury in determining the probable first aggressor 
in a homicide or assault case, its value has traditionally been 
limited by two evidentiary doctrines.  The first is the required 
use of reputation or opinion testimony, rather than specific 
instances of conduct, to prove character.4  The second is a 
 
2 Throughout this Article, I will use the term “alleged victim” to describe the 
other party in homicide and assault cases.  This is consistent with usage in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.  See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1) (using the words “alleged 
victim” throughout the text of the rule). 
3 See infra Part I.A; see also FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (permitting the accused to 
offer “[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the 
crime”). 
4 This requirement became Federal Rule of Evidence 405, which provides as 
follows: 
Rule 405.  Methods of Proving Character 
 (a) Reputation or opinion.  In all cases in which evidence of character or 
a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by 
testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. On 
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of 
conduct. 
 (b) Specific instances of conduct.  In cases in which character or a trait 
of character of a person is an essential element of a charge, claim, or 
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doctrine that allows a defendant of violent character to attack 
the alleged victim’s character for violence, yet prohibits the 
prosecution from introducing evidence regarding the defendant’s 
own character for violence.5 
These rules paint artificial, stilted character portraits of both 
the defendant and the alleged victim.6  On the one hand, the jury 
is deprived of knowledge concerning the specific violent acts of 
either party that might provide a more accurate character 
portrait than reputation or opinion testimony.7  On the other 
hand, if the defendant can attack the alleged victim’s character 
for violence with impunity, knowing that the prosecution is 
prohibited from introducing evidence of the defendant’s 
character for violence, the potential exists to mislead the jury 
into believing that the victim was violent but the defendant was 
peaceful.8  The ironic effect of these two character rules in self-
defense cases is to deny the jury the very evidence that would 
help it best weigh the probabilities of aggression and make an 
accurate determination. 
In 2000, the Federal Rules of Evidence Advisory Committee 
partially resolved the proof problems in self-defense cases by 
amending Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) (“Rule 
404(a)(1)”).  Under the amended rule, if the defendant attacks 
the character of an alleged crime victim, the prosecution may 
attack the character of the accused for the same trait.9  Rule 
 
defense, proof may also be made of specific instances of that person's 
conduct. 
FED. R. EVID. 405. 
5 See FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note on 2000 Amendment 
(noting that the evidentiary rules prior to the 2000 amendment did not permit the 
government to introduce negative character evidence against the accused unless the 
accused had first placed his good character at issue). 
6 See infra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. 
7 See generally infra Part I.B.3.  The character evidence rules at issue in this 
Article are Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 405.  The two are inextricably linked.  
As the Advisory Committee observed in its notes to Rule 404, “Once the 
admissibility of character evidence in some form is established under this rule, 
reference must then be made to Rule 405, which follows, in order to determine the 
appropriate method of proof.”  FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note. 
8 See FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note on 2000 Amendment (“The 
amendment makes clear that the accused cannot attack the alleged victim’s 
character and yet remain shielded from the disclosure of equally relevant evidence 
concerning the same character trait of the accused.”). 
9 FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note on 2000 Amendment. 
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404(a) was further amended in 2006 to resolve a “long-standing 
conflict in the circuits over whether character evidence can be 
offered to prove conduct in civil cases.”10  The 2006 amendment 
made Rule 404(a) exclusively applicable to criminal cases, but 
made no other changes.11 
In this Article, I suggest that the 2000 amendment to Rule 
404(a)(1) did not go far enough in enhancing the jury’s ability to 
determine the probable first aggressor in a homicide or assault 
case.  I propose a further amendment to Rule 404 that does two 
things:  (1) permits the defendant to introduce evidence of the 
alleged victim’s relevant, specific acts of violence to demonstrate 
the probability that the defendant was the first aggressor; and (2) 
permits the prosecution to reply in kind, subject to a specific 
balancing test and the defendant’s constitutional right to present 
a defense.  Regardless of whether the Advisory Committee 
adopts my proposed amendment, other American jurisdictions 
should consider amending their character evidence rules to 
enhance the fact-finding function of the jury in self-defense 
cases. 
 
10 Report from Jerry E. Smith, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules, to 
David F. Levi, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure 2–3 (May 
16, 2005), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/supct1105/Combined_EV 
_Report_Rules.pdf. 
11 See id.  The complete text of Rule 404(a), incorporating both the 2000 and 2006 
amendments, is as follows: 
 (a) Character evidence generally.  Evidence of a person’s character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
 (1) Character of accused.  In a criminal case, evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same, or if evidence of a trait of character of 
the alleged victim of the crime is offered by an accused and admitted 
under Rule 404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character of the 
accused offered by the prosecution; 
 (2) Character of alleged victim.  In a criminal case, and subject to 
the limitations imposed by Rule 412, evidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or 
by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of 
peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a 
homicide case to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first 
aggressor; 
 (3) Character of witness.  Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
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Part I of this Article examines the defense of self-defense, the 
nexus between self-defense and character evidence, and the 
historical development of the self-defense-related character 
evidence rules, culminating in the 2000 amendment to Rule 
404(a)(1).  Part II introduces a proposed amendment to Rule 
404.  Part III suggests a test for evaluating character evidence 
rules in self-defense cases and applies this test to several 
hypothetical situations, comparing the proposed rule with the 
current rules. 
I 
SELF-DEFENSE AND CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
A.  Raising Self-Defense 
The law has long recognized the right of a criminal defendant 
to claim self-defense when charged with assault or homicide.  If 
the defendant can demonstrate that he was unlawfully attacked 
by the alleged victim and had no recourse to the law for his 
defense, he is justified in taking reasonable steps to defend 
himself from physical harm.12  As Sir William Blackstone put it, 
“the law, in this case, respects the passions of the human mind; 
and . . . makes it lawful in him to do himself that immediate 
justice, to which he is prompted by nature, and which no 
prudential motives are strong enough to restrain.”13 
Self-defense is a classic justification defense14 that permits an 
individual to preserve his own personal autonomy at the expense 
of another’s under certain conditions.15  In the words of Joshua 
 
12 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 539 (4th ed. 2003). 
13 SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 619 
(George Chase ed., New York, Banks & Brothers 1894) (1877). 
14 A justification defense is one in which: 
The harm caused by justified behavior remains a legally recognized harm 
that is to be avoided whenever possible by other actors in the future.  
Under the special justifying circumstances, however, that harm is 
outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further a 
greater societal interest. 
PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW § 8.1, at 401 (1997). 
15 The noted criminal law scholar George Fletcher has nicely summarized the 
philosophical basis of the traditional view of self-defense as a justification defense: 
If a person’s autonomy is compromised by the intrusion, then the defender 
has the right to expel the intruder and restore the integrity of his domain.  
The underlying image is that of a state of warfare.  An aggressor’s violation 
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Dressler, “a non-aggressor is justified in using force upon 
another if he reasonably believes that such force is necessary to 
protect himself from imminent use of unlawful force by the other 
person.”16 
There are several triggering conditions that must exist before 
the use of force against another can be justified.  First, the 
defendant must have clean hands; in other words, he cannot be 
the first aggressor.17  Second, self-defense must be necessary 
under the circumstances:  if the defendant could reasonably have 
retreated (unless he was in his home or at the workplace), the 
defense will be unavailable to him.18  Third, the amount of force 
used by the defendant must be reasonable and proportional to 
the amount of force used against him.  A defendant who 
escalates the level of force by using deadly force in response to 
nondeadly force, for example, loses the ability to claim self-
defense.19  A defendant who establishes all the triggering 
conditions of self-defense has a complete defense to the charge 
of assault or homicide.20 
From an evidentiary standpoint, there are four primary 
methods to raise self-defense at trial:  eyewitness testimony, 
forensic evidence, a swearing contest between the defendant and 
the victim, and character evidence.  These methods can be used 
individually or in concert with each other.  Each method offers 
different strengths and weaknesses in the task of determining 
which party was the first aggressor in a self-defense case. 
Perhaps the most obvious evidentiary tool in a self-defense 
case is eyewitness testimony.  Subject to cross-examination, 
witnesses can testify in court about who threw the first punch, 
who drew the knife, or who unholstered the handgun.  The fact 
 
of our rights is akin to an intrusion of foreign troops on our soil.  As we are 
inclined to believe that any community has the absolute right to expel 
foreign invaders, any person attacked by another should have the absolute 
right to counteract aggression against his vital interests. 
GEORGE FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.5.3, at 860 (1978). 
16 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 237 (4th ed. 2006). 
17 Id. at 240–41.  As Dressler points out, the “clean hands” characterization can 
be something of an overstatement; there are circumstances in which a person may 
be justified in using deadly force, even if he was not free from fault in creating the 
situation.  Id. 
18 Id. 243–46. 
19 Id. 238. 
20 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 60 (2007). 
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finder can evaluate the credibility of witnesses and decide 
whether the facts justify the defense.  Eyewitness testimony, 
however, is notoriously unreliable,21 particularly in homicide or 
assault cases.  In a fast-moving, violent encounter between two 
or more parties, there is little likelihood of reliable eyewitness 
testimony on the issue of self-defense, especially if the 
eyewitness’s attention was drawn to the confrontation after it 
had already started.22  Nevertheless, eyewitness testimony, if 
available, is a crucial component of a self-defense case. 
Forensic evidence may also play a role in self-defense cases, 
particularly if there are obvious indicators such as defensive 
wounds.23  When combined with supportive eyewitness 
 
21 It is far beyond the scope of this Article to expound at length on the numerous 
deficiencies of eyewitness testimony in criminal trials.  As one recent article 
documented, there have been more than 400 articles in psychological literature and 
more than 500 articles in legal literature on “[t]he dangerous inaccuracy of 
eyewitnesses and the inordinate credence given to them by jurors.”  Steven B. 
Duke, Ann Seung-Eun Lee & Chet K.W. Pager, A Picture’s Worth a Thousand 
Words:  Conversational Versus Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). 
22 See, e.g., Henry J. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the 
Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2006 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 12–14 (June 2006), 
available at http://www.fclr.org/2006fedctslrev1.htm.  Fradella notes that when 
people do not know a significant event is occurring, their attention is not focused on 
the event, which can lead to poor perception and memory of the event.  On the 
other hand, violence has a negative effect on witness perception and memory, in 
particular the “weapons effect,” a phenomenon that occurs when “witnesses spend 
more time and psychic energy focusing on the weapon rather than on other aspects 
of the event,” and which “results in incomplete or inaccurate information about the 
crime scene and the perpetrator.”  Id. at 14. 
23 In a stabbing case, for example, a victim may have defensive wounds “on the 
palms of the hands and outer surfaces of the forearms.”  CHARLES E. O’HARA & 
GREGORY L. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION 541 (5th 
ed. 1980).  The victim’s defensive wounds, or the lack thereof, can provide valuable 
clues in identifying whether an unidentified assailant was a stranger to the victim.  
For example, in an article on motives for serving as a public defender, Charles 
Ogletree discusses the murder of his sister, a police officer, in California.  Noting 
the absence of “defensive wounds of the type that would be expected if [she] . . . 
had been confronted in her home by an intruder,” he surmised that she had been 
killed by someone who knew her.  Charles Ogletree, Beyond Justifications:  Seeking 
Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1261 (1993).  In 
an article on the usefulness of criminal psychological profiles at trial, another author 
uses a case study in which a woman was bludgeoned to death by someone with a 
hammer.  Among other things, the absence of defensive wounds suggested that she 
had been killed by someone she knew well.  Her husband later confessed to the 
crime.  See Scott Ingram, If the Profile Fits:  Admitting Criminal Psychological 
Profiles into Evidence in Criminal Trials, 54 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 239, 
266 (1998). 
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testimony, forensic evidence is a powerful tool at trial for 
identifying the first aggressor.  Standing alone, however, forensic 
evidence may not be sufficiently conclusive to identify the first 
aggressor in a case.24  For example, in a case where both parties 
bear defensive wounds and the eyewitnesses are not entirely 
sure what happened, forensic evidence may be of limited value.  
Similarly, in a case without eyewitnesses where the available 
forensic evidence is inconclusive, the jury will have to look to 
other sources of information to resolve competing claims in a 
self-defense case. 
Of course, the defendant always has the right to take the stand 
in his own defense to tell his story.25  If the alleged victim is still 
alive and can testify, the trial could become a swearing contest to 
determine which of two competing versions of events are true.26  
As previously mentioned, forensic evidence, eyewitness 
testimony, or both could be employed to buttress either or both 
versions of events.27  If the alleged victim is deceased, the 
possibility of a swearing contest between the parties is 
diminished,28 and the defendant is left with the unpleasant 
prospect of claiming self-defense against a dead man. 
 
24 Cf. O’HARA & O’HARA, supra note 23, at 545 (“In the absence of 
eyewitnesses it is not always a simple matter to determine whether a death from 
gunshot wounds is an accident, suicide, or murder.”). 
25 In some instances, this will be the only viable method available for raising self-
defense.  Cf. Keith A. Swisher, The Limits of Rule 408 After Hernandez, 35 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1437, 1458 (2003) (noting that in civil assault cases, a party might have a 
critical need to testify “where the party’s testimony is solely dispositive–e.g., where 
the party is the only witness, save the defendant, in a civil assault case, and the 
defendant claims self-defense.”).  This same principle would apply to the defendant 
who wants to claim self-defense in a criminal assault case; in order to sustain his 
theory, he might have a “critical need to testify.” 
26 Cf. Sherry F. Colb, “Whodunit” Versus “What Was Done”:  When to Admit 
Character Evidence in Criminal Cases, 79 N.C. L. REV. 939, 988 (2001) (suggesting 
that in cases where “what was done” is at issue, such as who started a fight in an 
assault case, the defendant and victim essentially become locked in a swearing 
contest in which the jury must decide who is telling the truth). 
27 Cf. id. (asserting that even in cases involving “an abundance of physical 
evidence, juries must decide which witnesses’ explanations for the physical evidence 
are the most compelling.”). 
28 Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is possible to have a swearing contest 
of sorts even if the alleged victim is deceased.  For example, if the alleged victim 
lived long enough to make a dying declaration concerning the cause of death, 
evidence of the declaration could be admitted.  See FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2) 
(permitting admission, in a homicide case, of “a statement made by a declarant 
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Under any circumstances, the jury’s task of weighing 
probabilities of aggression is a difficult one indeed.  The 
common law developed two character evidence rules to assist 
the jury in evaluating the claim of self-defense.  The first rule 
allows the defendant to introduce evidence of the victim’s 
violent character known to the defendant at the time of the 
incident to prove that the defendant suffered a reasonable fear of 
death or grievous bodily injury at the hands of the victim.29  The 
second rule allows the defendant to introduce evidence of the 
victim’s violent character whether or not known to the defendant 
at the time of the incident to suggest that the victim was the first 
aggressor.30  This Article focuses exclusively on the second rule, 
the use of character evidence for the purpose of portraying the 
victim as the first aggressor. 
B.  Character Evidence and Self-Defense 
1.  Logical Structure 
The logic behind the use of character evidence to prove 
propensity is straightforward.  The first step is proving that an 
 
while believing that the declarant’s death was imminent, concerning the cause or 
circumstances of what the declarant believed to be impending death”). 
29 This rule applied primarily in homicide cases.  The key to this use of character 
evidence is the defendant’s prior knowledge of the victim’s character: 
As the purpose . . . is to show the accused’s state of mind, it is obvious that 
the deceased’s character, as affecting the accused’s apprehensions, must 
have become known to him, i.e., proof of the character must indispensably 
be accompanied by proof of its communication to the accused; else it is 
irrelevant. 
1A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 63, at 1369 (Tillers rev. 1983) [hereinafter 
WIGMORE (Tillers rev.)].  The defendant’s state of mind with respect to the victim’s 
character for violence “at the time of the killing becomes material; and an 
important element in determining his justification is his belief in an impending 
attack by the deceased.”  2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 246, at 50 (Chadbourn rev. 
1979) [hereinafter WIGMORE (Chadbourn rev.)]. 
30 According to Benjamin Tillers: 
It is now generally the rule that the accused may show a pertinent trait of 
the character of the alleged victim that bears on the question of whether or 
not the victim committed a particular act on a particular occasion in 
conformity with that trait of character.  For this purpose, it is immaterial 
whether the defendant knew of that character trait before the time of the 
commission of the alleged crime. 
WIGMORE (Tillers rev.), supra note 29, § 63, at 1350. 
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individual has a particular character trait.31  A character trait is 
established either by specific acts or by testimony in the form of 
reputation or opinion evidence.32  This leads to the second step, 
the inference that the character trait is evidence of the 
individual’s propensity to behave in a particular manner.33  The 
third inferential step is the conclusion that the propensity or 
character trait has predictive value in determining how an 
individual acted on a particular occasion.34 
In a self-defense case in which the victim’s character for 
violence is at issue, the character rules would work as follows:  
(1) victim John has committed specific acts of violence or has a 
reputation in the community for violence; (2) John therefore has 
a character trait, i.e., a propensity, towards violence; (3) on this 
particular occasion, we can conclude that John probably 
behaved in accordance with his propensity for violence and was 
likely the first aggressor in the encounter with the defendant. 
2.  Character Evidence in the Courtroom 
Although propensity evidence is a valuable part of everyday 
decision making,35 its use at trial has traditionally been 
prohibited in common law courtrooms.36  Among other things,37 
 
31 Cf. Edward J. Imwinkelreid, An Evidentiary Paradox:  Defending the Character 
Evidence Prohibition by Upholding a Non-Character Theory of Logical Relevance, 
The Doctrine of Chances, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 419, 426 (2006).  Imwinkelreid 
discusses the logic behind the general prohibition on character evidence, using a 
three-part structure:  part one is the item of evidence that shows the defendant’s 
other misdeeds; part two is the intermediate inference that the defendant has 
subjectively bad character; part three is the conclusion that on the charged occasion, 
the defendant acted in accordance with his bad character.  Id. 
32 See FED. R. EVID. 405 (listing reputation, opinion, and specific instances of 
conduct as the three methods of proving character). 
33 Cf. Imwinkelreid, supra note 31, at 426. 
34 Cf. id. 
35 As several scholars and commentators have pointed out, people tend to rely on 
character evidence on a daily basis to make important decisions, because “[p]ast 
conduct or performance is usually thought to be one of the best predictors of future 
behavior.”  CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 
4.11, at 183 (3d ed. 2003); accord Imwinkelreid, supra note 31, at 425–26 (noting the 
value of character as predictive of behavior in everyday life and using the example 
of a parent being able to discern which child made a household mess based on past 
performance). 
36 David P. Leonard, In Defense of the Character Evidence Prohibition:  
Foundations of the Rule Against Trial by Character, 73 IND. L.J. 1161, 1164–65 
(1998) (“For at least two centuries, both English and American courts have 
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this prohibition is grounded in a historical mistrust of the jury’s 
ability to properly understand and use character evidence.38  
Conventional wisdom is that improperly used character evidence 
can have an almost talismanic effect on a jury, raising the specter 
that the jury will convict for past conduct or other improper 
reasons,39 or that it will disregard the constitutional standard of 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.40  A further criticism of 
character evidence is that while it may be “a useful gauge of 
likely behavior patterns over a period of time, [it is] less accurate 
when used to decide what happened on one particular occasion 
because people do not always act in accordance with their 
propensities.”41 
The traditional common law prohibition against character 
evidence was adopted by the Federal Rules of Evidence upon 
their promulgation in 1975.  Reflecting the common law’s 
general prohibition on character evidence, Rule 404(a) states 
that “[e]vidence of a person’s character or a trait of character is 
 
generally prohibited the use of character evidence as circumstantial proof that a 
person engaged in particular conduct at issue in the case.”). 
37 For example, David Leonard lists several historical legal rationales for the 
character evidence prohibition:  (1) a consideration for the rights of the accused that 
differentiated the common law from the civil law; (2) the danger of unfair prejudice; 
(3) the danger of unfairly surprising the criminal accused with such evidence; and 
(4) overcomplication of the issues and potential for confusion.  See id. at 1180–86. 
38 In Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948), Justice Jackson explained 
the historic rationale for prohibiting prosecutorial use of character evidence at trial:  
“The inquiry is not rejected because character is irrelevant; on the contrary, it is 
said to weigh too much with the jury and to so overpersuade them as to prejudge 
one with a bad general record and deny him a fair opportunity to defend against a 
particular charge.”  Id. at 475–76. 
39 According to Simon Greenleaf, an evidence scholar of the nineteenth century, 
the reason the prosecution in a criminal case is not allowed to use character 
evidence as proof of the accused’s guilt is that “such evidence is too likely to move 
the jury to condemnation irrespective of his actual guilt of the offense charged.”  1 
SIMON GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 14b(1), at 39 
(Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 16th ed. 1899); see also Imwinkelreid, supra note 31, 
at 427 (“There is a grave risk that the jury may decide to punish the defendant for 
being a criminal rather than because the jurors are convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime.”). 
40 Imwinkelreid points out that if jurors believe a defendant’s uncharged 
misconduct is heinous or repulsive, they may on a conscious level decide to nullify 
the requirement to convict beyond a reasonable doubt in order to protect society.  
Imwinkelreid, supra note 31, at 427. 
41 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 4.11, at 183–84. 
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not admissible for the purpose of proving action in conformity 
therewith on a particular occasion.”42 
3.  Character Evidence and Self-Defense Under the Common Law 
a.  The Decision to Introduce Character Evidence 
Under the common law, the criminal defendant held the key 
to the admission of character evidence pertaining to his own 
character.43  According to the so-called “mercy rule,” a criminal 
accused could introduce evidence of his own good character to 
suggest reasonable doubt as to the charges against him.44  The 
prosecution could rebut the defendant’s character evidence 
either by calling character witnesses of its own, or by cross-
examining the defendant’s character witnesses with specific 
instances of the defendant’s conduct to test their knowledge.45  If 
the defendant elected to say nothing about his character, the 
subject was off-limits to the prosecution.  In Michelson v. United 
States, a famous character evidence case from the mid-twentieth 
century, the Supreme Court explained that the law does not 
“invest[] the defendant with a presumption of good character, 
but it simply closes the whole matter of character . . . disposition 
and reputation on the prosecution’s case-in-chief.”46 
 
42 FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
43 See, e.g., GREENLEAF, supra note 39, § 14b(1), at 39 (explaining that the 
accused may always invoke his good character in his defense, following which the 
prosecution could introduce evidence of his bad character in reply). 
44 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 4.12, at 185 (defining the 
“mercy rule” as an exception to the historic character prohibition in which “an 
accused may offer evidence of a pertinent trait of his character to support an 
inference that he was unlikely to have committed the charged offense”); see also 
WIGMORE (Tillers rev.), supra note 29, § 56, at 1162 (referring to the ability of a 
defendant to introduce good character evidence in his defense and stating, “But it is 
now well understood to be always admissible and that character is admissible upon 
charges of all grades, even mere misdemeanors”). 
45 WIGMORE (Tillers rev.), supra note 29, § 58, at 1198 (“After a defendant has 
attempted to show his good character in his own aid, prosecution may in rebuttal 
offer as evidence his bad character.”).  The forms of evidence available to the 
prosecution in rebuttal included reputation or opinion testimony, but not 
affirmative evidence of the defendant’s specific acts.  See id. § 58.1, at 1210–11.  
Although evidence of specific acts was inadmissible on its own, the prosecution 
could test the testimony of the defendant’s witnesses “by asking whether the witness 
has heard of specific misconduct.”  GREENLEAF, supra note 39, § 14f, at 48; see also 
FED. R. EVID. 405(a) (permitting cross-examination on specific relevant instances of 
conduct). 
46 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) (citation omitted). 
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There appear to be two broad historical justifications for 
placing the decision to use character evidence in the hands of the 
defendant, rather than the prosecutor.  First, the common law 
had a well-documented mistrust of the jury’s ability to use 
character evidence properly.  If affirmatively introduced by the 
prosecution, character evidence could influence the jury to make 
decisions for improper reasons, possibly relieving the 
prosecution of the burden to prove guilt on the particular charge 
beyond a reasonable doubt.47  Prosecutorial introduction of 
character evidence would also flout a foundational principle of 
Anglo-American law, the concept that a criminal defendant 
should be tried on the charges against him rather than for his 
life’s character.48 
The second primary reason for placing the character decision 
in the hands of the defendant was to preserve balance.  “There is 
reason to believe,” wrote a nineteenth-century American court, 
“that this exception [the exclusion of character evidence against 
the defendant] originated in a usurpation of legislative power by 
English judges, led by a merciful impulse to mitigate the cruelty 
of a bloody criminal code by throwing obstacles in the way of its 
operation.”49  In other words, giving the defendant exclusive 
control over character evidence was intended to serve as a shield 
against the power of the state. 
One scholar has referred to the policy of letting the defendant 
use character evidence in his defense as “the inborn sporting 
instinct of Anglo-Normandom–the instinct of giving the game 
fair play even at the expense of efficiency of procedure.”50  The 
policy, which provides that a man on trial for his life or liberty 
ought to have a sporting chance to defend himself, permits the 
 
47 See supra Part I.B.2. 
48 Cf. Major Stephen R. Henley, Caveat Criminale:  The Impact of the New 
Military Rules of Evidence in Sexual Offense and Child Molestation Cases, ARMY 
LAW., March 1996, at 82, 86 (“American jurisprudence is grounded in the theory 
that courts try cases rather than persons.”). 
49 Darling v. Westmoreland, 52 N.H. 401, 406 (N.H. 1872).  It should be noted 
that the Darling court was not in favor of what it found to be “a plain departure 
from the general principle which admits relevant and material evidence.”  Id.  As 
the Darling court also observed, however, faced with a criminal code that included 
160 capital offenses, “courts were exposed to a temptation, greater than they were 
able to resist, to strain the law, and moderate its barbarity by the introduction of 
anomalies and logical deformities, in favorem vitae, in the interest of humanity.”  Id. 
at 407. 
50 WIGMORE (Tillers rev.), supra note 29, § 57, at 1185. 
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accused to enjoy a small advantage over the government in 
matters related to character evidence.  Its significance does not 
rest on its utility to the accused or on its handicapping effect on 
the prosecution.  Rather, the policy is important because of its 
implied message that criminal justice is concerned not only with 
convicting the guilty, but also with ensuring that the innocent are 
not improperly found guilty using inappropriate evidence.51 
If the decision to introduce character evidence rests with the 
state, the potential prejudice to the defendant and the interests 
of justice is considerable:  not only might the defendant suffer an 
unjust conviction, but the values at the bedrock of the criminal 
justice system suffer if juries are permitted to make decisions for 
the wrong reasons, and using the wrong evidence.52  On the 
other hand, the state suffers relatively little prejudice when the 
character evidence decision rests with the accused:  if the 
accused is convicted in the absence of negative character 
evidence against him, the likelihood is higher that the jury 
reached its decision for the proper reasons.  In the final analysis, 
leaving the character evidence decision up to the defendant may 
lead to verdicts that are more just than they would otherwise 
be.53 
b.  Victim Character Evidence 
No one would seriously argue with the proposition that a 
criminal justice system should provide fairness and due process 
to the defendant.  There is a legitimate question, however, 
whether that should occur at the expense of an alleged crime 
victim.  As Richard Uviller has observed, permitting the 
 
51 See id. § 58.2, at 1216.  Other examples of the law giving a criminal a sporting 
chance are the entrapment and insanity defenses.  Interview with Professor William 
A. Schroeder, Professor of Law, S. Ill. Univ. Carbondale Sch. of Law, in 
Carbondale, Ill. (June 21, 2007). 
52 Relying on Supreme Court precedent, two scholars have identified three 
“bedrock due process principles” that are threatened by the prosecutorial 
introduction of pure propensity evidence against criminal defendants:  (1) the 
presumption of innocence; (2) the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt; 
and (3) the prohibition against status crimes.  Drew D. Dropkin & James H. 
McComas, On a Collision Course:  Pure Propensity Evidence and Due Process in 
Alaska, 18 ALASKA L. REV. 177, 191–96 (2001). 
53 See WIGMORE (Tillers rev.), supra note 29, § 57, at 1185 (“But, as a pure 
question of policy, the doctrine is and can be supported as one better calculated 
than the opposite to lead to just verdicts.”). 
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defendant to offer proof of the victim’s bad character could 
damage a person (the victim) who has not placed his or her 
character in issue at trial.54  Nevertheless, evidence of the 
victim’s character can play a valuable role at trial, particularly in 
homicide or assault cases, in helping the jury determine what 
happened in the incident at bar. 55  As with the rules governing 
evidence of the defendant’s character, the hallmark of the 
common law rules was a balancing of the relative interests of the 
defendant and the victim at trial.56  In the words of Benjamin 
Tillers, “It should not be forgotten that the accused is on trial, 
whereas in a criminal prosecution the victim, except in a 
metaphorical and literal sense, is not.”57 
Thus, the common law gave the criminal defendant the ability 
to introduce evidence pertaining to the victim’s bad character in 
certain instances, primarily homicide, assault, and rape cases.58 
These attacks could be rebutted with evidence of the victim’s 
good character.59  Taking this concept further, Dean John Henry 
Wigmore believed that if the defendant was permitted to attack 
the victim’s character for violence, “the same principle would 
then justify the prosecution (or plaintiff) in introducing the 
defendant’s character for violence.”60  Significantly, however, the 
 
54 H. Richard Uviller, Evidence of Character to Prove Conduct:  Illusion, Illogic, 
and Injustice in the Courtroom, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 845, 855 (1982). 
55 Id. at 856 (“This evidence might support the inference that the defendant had 
reason to be fearful of the victim or that the victim might have been the first 
aggressor in the disputed incident.”); see also Mary Kay Kleiss, A New 
Understanding of Specific Act Evidence in Homicide Cases Where the Accused 
Claims Self-Defense:  Striking the Proper Balance Between Competing Policy Goals, 
32 IND. L. REV. 1437, 1439 (1999) (“The accused introduces evidence of the 
decedent’s violent character to establish that it was more probable that the 
decedent was the initial aggressor based on the inference that, at the time of the act, 
the decedent’s conduct was in conformity with his character for violence.”). 
56 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee Note (“While its basis lies 
more in history and experience than in logic an underlying justification can fairly be 
found in terms of the relative presence and absence of prejudice in the various 
situations.”). 
57 WIGMORE (Tillers rev.), supra note 29, § 63, at 1379 n.7. 
58 Although the common law rules were broadly written to include all types of 
victim character evidence, experience has shown that the primary use of victim 
character evidence at common law was in homicide/assault cases and rape cases.  
See H. Richard Uviller, supra note 54, at 856 n.34. 
59 WIGMORE (Tillers rev.), supra note 29, § 63, at 1369 (“The state may of course 
offer a relevant trait of the victim’s character, such as the deceased’s peaceable 
character, in response to an attack on the character of the victim by the accused.”). 
60 See id. at 1378–79. 
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majority of American jurisdictions have not historically 
permitted the prosecution to rebut an attack on the victim’s 
character with a counterattack on the defendant’s character.61 
Although the majority approach in Anglo-American 
evidentiary law permitted the defendant to attack the victim’s 
character with impunity, a small minority of American 
jurisdictions has experimented with making the defendant pay a 
price for attacking the victim’s character.62  In a 1926 Kentucky 
case, the court reasoned that if the defendant could introduce 
evidence of the deceased victim’s bad character for “peace and 
quietude,” the defendant’s own bad character for the same trait 
should also be received in evidence; somewhat reluctantly, 
however, the court concluded that the law clearly prohibited 
such an innovation.63  Missouri, in contrast, a common law 
evidence jurisdiction, has long permitted the prosecution to 
rebut defense attacks on the victim’s character by attacks on the 
defendant’s character for the same trait.64  Illinois, another 
common law evidence jurisdiction, likewise permits the 
prosecution, under limited circumstances, to rebut evidence of 
the victim’s poor character with evidence of the defendant’s 
 
61 See generally id. at 1379 n.7 (collecting and digesting cases from several 
jurisdictions on the issue of using evidence of the defendant’s character to rebut 
attacks on the victim’s character). 
62 See, e.g., State v. Winstead, 15 So. 2d 793, 798 (La. 1943).  According to the 
Winstead court: 
Evidence of previous quarrels or previous threats on the part of the 
defendant is always admissible, not only as tending to show that he was the 
aggressor in the final difficulty, in cases where he pleads self-defense, but 
also as tending to show that the defendant committed the crime, in a case 
where he denies that he is the one who committed the crime. 
Id.; see also Carr v. State, 227 S.W. 776, 776 (Ark. 1921) (stating in dicta that 
because a plea of self-defense was interposed, the general reputation for peace and 
quiet both of the accused and of the deceased victim were admissible to show who 
was the first aggressor). 
63 Strong v. Commonwealth, 287 S.W. 235, 238 (Ky. 1926) (holding that the trial 
court improperly admitted evidence of the defendant’s turbulent reputation when 
he had not introduced evidence of his good reputation). 
64 Missouri is a common law evidence jurisdiction whose Supreme Court adopted 
the rule in 1939.  See State v. Robinson, 130 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Mo. 1939) (holding 
that “where an accused tenders the factual issue of the bad character of the victim 
of his assault to substantiate his plea of self-defense he thereby . . . opens up for 
inquiry all evidence of like quality having probative value on the merits of said 
ultimate factual issue”). 
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poor character.65  In 1991, California amended its evidence code 
to permit the prosecution to rebut defense attacks on the 
victim’s character for violence with attacks on the defendant’s 
character for violence.66 
4.  Self-Defense and Character Evidence Under the Federal Rules 
When the Federal Rules of Evidence were promulgated, the 
common law character evidence system was adopted without 
significant change.67  In fact, as will be discussed later in this 
section, the methods of proving character and the purposes for 
which character evidence may be introduced at trial were 
virtually the same under the common law and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence until the Advisory Committee’s 2000 amendment to 
Rule 404(a)(1). 
a.  Methods of Proof 
There are three ways to prove character at trial:  specific acts, 
reputation testimony, and opinion testimony.68  Of these, the 
 
65 According to William Schroeder: 
It also appears that the prosecution can rebut evidence of the victim’s poor 
character with evidence of the defendant’s poor character, including 
evidence of specific instances of conduct. . . . However, the prosecution 
cannot rebut evidence of the defendant’s peaceful character with evidence 
that the deceased was also peaceful. . . . Moreover, the state may not 
respond to evidence of specific instances of the defendant’s non-violent 
behavior with evidence of the defendant’s violent character. 
11 WILLIAM A. SCHROEDER, ILLINOIS PRACTICE SERIES:  COURTROOM 
HANDBOOK ON ILLINOIS EVIDENCE 165 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
66 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103 (West 2007) (noting in the legislative history that 
the statute was amended in 1991 pertaining to the admissibility of the defendant’s 
character for violence). 
67 See FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note (observing that the 
character evidence pattern existant in most jurisdictions at the time the rules were 
promulgated “is incorporated in the rule” and that the criminal rule “is so deeply 
imbedded in our jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional proportions and 
to override doubts of the basic relevancy of the evidence”). 
68 Compare FED. R. EVID. 405 (listing reputation, opinion and specific instances 
of conduct as methods of proving character), with GREENLEAF, supra note 39, § 
14e, at 48 (stating that the “three conceivable ways of evidencing the character of a 
human being” are the testimony of those who know him, his reputation in the 
community, and particular instances of conduct). 
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strongest form of proof is specific acts.69  Opinion testimony is 
the second-strongest form of proof.70  Reputation is considered 
the weakest.71 
Specific acts are relevant to character because of the 
prevailing belief that past acts define one’s character and serve 
as a predictor of future acts.72  The logic is simple:  X commits an 
act; the act is proof of X’s character; X’s future acts will be in 
accordance with his character.73  In everyday life, most decisions 
regarding character are made on the basis of reports of specific 
acts.74 
At trial, however, the use of specific acts to prove character 
presents some difficulties.75  First, the person against whom the 
character evidence is offered may not agree that the specific acts 
ever occurred in the first place.  This could create trials within a 
trial, spawning myriad issues that might tend to confuse the jury 
and divert them from the task of deciding the actual case in 
controversy before them.76  Second, there is no settled formula 
for how many specific acts it takes to develop a particular 
propensity or character trait.77  The cumulative presentation of 
 
69 See FED. R. EVID. 405 Advisory Committee’s Note (“Of the three methods of 
proving character provided by the rule, evidence of specific instances of conduct is 
the most convincing.”); MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 4.19, at 217. 
70 See Uviller, supra note 54, at 851. 
71 MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 4.19, at 215 (stating that 
reputation is the most well-established, but weakest, method for proving character). 
72 Imwinkelreid, supra note 31, at 426. 
73 See id. 
74 Id. 
75 See Uviller, supra note 54, at 850 (“Although the probative value of evidence 
of specific acts exhibiting the trait in question is probably superior to proof by either 
of the other two modes, it is also thought to be most distracting and time 
consuming.”). 
76 Cf. Kleiss, supra note 55, at 1447 (noting that allowing proof of specific acts 
could increase the issues and prolong the trial). 
77 Compare id. (discussing the argument that a single act might have been 
uncharacteristic of the defendant’s life), with Imwinkelreid, supra note 31, at 429 
(although relatively confident predictions of a person’s behavior can be made when 
there is a large sample of that person’s conduct in similar situations, more 
generalized character traits are poor predictors of behavior on a particular 
occasion), and Charles H. Rose III, Should the Tail Wag the Dog?  The Potential 
Effects of Recidivism Data on Character Evidence Rules, 36 N.M. L. REV. 341, 366–
67 (2006) (asserting that many of the legal theories underlying the use of character 
evidence at trial are not in sync with current psychological research on character 
and personality). 
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specific-acts witnesses can be judicially inefficient and could 
potentially waste a great deal of the fact finder’s time; 
conversely, the failure to present enough evidence of specific 
acts could result in the jury reaching critical character 
conclusions without enough supporting information.78 
Reputation testimony is a form of hearsay in which the 
witness testifies concerning what the members of a particular 
community are saying about another person.79  The reputation 
that a person earns is, in essence, a form of shorthand, a 
summary, based on the specific acts, omissions, and words of the 
person in that particular community over a given period of 
time.80  The jury does not, however, get to hear about the 
specific words or events that led to the community’s conclusion.  
On cross-examination, the examiner is permitted to test the 
witness’s knowledge by asking about specific instances of 
conduct that might be contrary to the reputation.81  For example, 
if a defense witness testifies that the criminal defendant has a 
reputation as a peaceful man, the prosecutor on cross-
 
78 Imwinkelreid cites research that refers to this phenomenon as the “halo 
effect,” the tendency of people to judge one another on the basis of one outstanding 
good or bad characteristic.  Imwinkelreid, supra note 31, at 428. 
79 See GREENLEAF, supra note 39, § 461d, at 586–87.  According to Greenleaf, 
“[I]t must be remembered that reputation is used only by way of an exception to the 
Hearsay rule.”  Id. at 586; see also FED. R. EVID. 803(19), 803(20), 803(21) 
(codifying hearsay exceptions involving reputation for, respectively, personal or 
family history, boundaries or general history, and character). 
80 The Supreme Court has aptly described reputation evidence as follows: 
The evidence which the law permits is not as to the personality of 
defendant but only as to the shadow his daily life has cast in his 
neighborhood.  This has been well described in a different connection as 
“the slow growth of months and years, the resultant picture of forgotten 
incidents, passing events, habitual and daily conduct, presumably honest 
because disinterested, and safer to be trusted because prone to suspect . . . . 
It is for that reason that such general repute is permitted to be proven.  It 
sums up a multitude of trivial details.  It compacts into the brief phrase of a 
verdict the teaching of many incidents and the conduct of years.  It is the 
average intelligence drawing its conclusion.” 
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948) (quoting Badger v. Badger, 88 
N.Y. 546, 552 (N.Y. 1882)) (omission in original). 
81 According to Rule 405, “On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into 
relevant specific instances of conduct.”  FED. R. EVID. 405(a).  The purpose of this 
cross-examination is to “expose the untrustworthiness of [the witness’s] testimony if 
he admits that such rumors of misconduct are known to him; for the knowledge of 
such rumors may well be inconsistent with his assertion that the person’s reputation 
is good.”  GREENLEAF, supra note 39, § 461d(4), at 588. 
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examination can ask, “Have you heard that the defendant 
stabbed a stranger in a bar fight?” 
Opinion testimony permits a witness to testify concerning his 
opinion of a particular character trait of the subject.82  As with 
reputation testimony, opinion testimony is based on observation 
of the subject’s acts, omissions, or words during a particular time 
period.83  The jury is, however, denied knowledge of the specific 
incidents upon which the witness based her opinion.  Opinion 
testimony can be tested through cross-examination into the 
witness’s knowledge of specific instances of conduct.84 
Federal Rule of Evidence 405, which controls the methods of 
proving character at trial, limits proof of character to reputation 
and opinion testimony.85  While this avoids some of the 
conceptual and philosophical problems associated with specific-
acts testimony, it also deprives the jury of the strongest evidence 
regarding the character of criminal defendants and alleged crime 
victims.  As will be discussed later, in certain cases it may not 
only interfere with the jury’s truth-finding function, but also 
make it nearly impossible for the defendant to present a 
meaningful and viable defense. 
Reputation and opinion testimony, while relatively simple in 
concept and efficient in application, are crude tools for 
determining character at trial.86  Reputation evidence is nothing 
more than filtered hearsay,87 of dubious probative value under 
the best of circumstances.88  Because it is limited to one person’s 
observations, opinion testimony is more tightly focused and 
 
82 Uviller, supra note 54, at 851 n.18. 
83 Id. 
84 FED. R. EVID. 405(a). 
85 See id. 
86 See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 13 (Mass. 2005), in which the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently precluded the use of reputation 
or opinion testimony to prove the identity of the first aggressor in self-defense 
cases, claiming that “[r]eputations or opinions are often formed based on rumor or 
other unreliable hearsay sources, without any personal knowledge on the part of the 
person holding that opinion.”  Id.  Prior to the Adjutant opinion, Massachusetts had 
only permitted the use of victim character known to the defendant, including 
reputation and specific acts, “as it bears on the defendant’s state of mind and the 
reasonableness of his actions in claiming to have acted in self-defense.”  Id. at 6 
(citations omitted). 
87 See GREENLEAF, supra note 39, § 461d, at 586–87. 
88 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 4.19, at 215 (stating that 
reputation is the “least reliable” method of proof). 
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therefore more valuable than reputation testimony in 
determining character at trial.89  Nonetheless, opinion testimony 
is still nothing more than a filter through which the witness is 
permitted to interpret another person’s specific acts.90 
The formulaic recitation of reputation or opinion testimony 
also limits its usefulness by conflating various types of behavior 
under broad character categories such as “chaste, peaceable, 
truthful, honest,” and so forth.91  The problem with these 
“linguistic boxes,” as Richard Uviller has called them, is that 
they “have lost their integrity.  A term thought to describe a 
discrete and persistent element of personality, such as ‘law-
abiding’ or ‘cautious,’ may arise from a wide range of behavioral 
events or attitudes, and affords only the crudest index for the 
prediction of a given act consistent with it.”92  In other words, 
both reputation and opinion testimony sweep with a broad, 
conclusory brush that significantly limits their actual value.93  
 
89 Uviller notes that both Wigmore and Greenleaf favored the use of opinion 
testimony at trial in preference to reputation testimony, and that both men 
regretted that American law had adopted a preference for reputation testimony.  
Uviller, supra note 54, at 851 n.18. 
90 As the common law developed, there was some controversy about the 
appropriate form of opinion evidence.  In the beginning, witnesses were permitted 
to answer very particular questions about another person’s character, but in time, 
only general questions were permitted.  See WIGMORE (Chadbourn rev.), supra 
note 29, § 1981, at 207–09.  “General character” meant, “the general or abstract trait 
as distinguished from particular instances of it.”  Id. at 209. 
91 Cf. FED. R. EVID. 405 Advisory Committee’s Note (“Traditionally character 
has been regarded primarily in moral overtones of good and bad:  chaste, peaceable, 
truthful, honest.”). 
92 Uviller, supra note 54, at 849. 
93 This is because as a foundational matter for reputation testimony, the examiner 
must ask the witness whether the witness whose character is being discussed has a 
reputation in the community for a particular character trait.  See MUELLER & 
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 4.19, at 215 (discussing foundation for reputation 
testimony).  For opinion testimony, the examiner must ask whether the witness has 
formed an opinion of the person’s character for a particular trait.  See id. at 216–17 
(discussing foundation for opinion testimony). 
 Character traits tend to be broadly categorized.  Charles McCormick defined 
character as “a generalized description of one’s disposition, or of one’s disposition 
in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness.”  
CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 162, at 340–
41 (1st ed. 1954) (emphasis added), quoted in FED. R. EVID. 406 Advisory 
Committee’s Note.  Broadly categorized character traits, however, may not be 
particularly helpful in predicting behavior.  Cf. Imwinkelreid, supra note 31, at 428 
(“However, there is a good deal of research indicating that more generalized 
character traits are relatively poor predictors of conduct on a specific occasion.”). 
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The noted evidence scholar Charles McCormick observed that, 
“[a]s one moves from the specific to the general in this fashion 
[from specific acts to opinion to reputation], the pungency and 
persuasiveness of the evidence declines.”94 
For example, suppose that Arnold and Bart were involved in 
a bar fight against each other.  Both claim self-defense; both 
claim the other man was the first aggressor.  Both men have a 
reputation in the community for violence and aggression.  
Arnold gained his reputation from regularly starting bar fights 
with total strangers.  Bart, in contrast, earned his reputation by 
committing acts of physical abuse against his wife and children.  
In this case, reputation or opinion testimony alone will be of 
little value to the jury in determining which of the two men 
started the fight.  This is because the foundational questions for 
either reputation or opinion testimony will provide the jury with 
no more information than that Arnold and Bart are “violent” or 
“aggressive.” 
Theoretically, the jury might get to hear information about 
the specific acts underlying Arnold and Bart’s reputations.  This 
is because Rule 405 permits cross-examination concerning 
specific acts or instances of conduct as a method of testing the 
basis for a character witness’s testimony.95  There are, however, 
two significant limitations to cross-examination under Rule 405.  
First, the specific acts revealed on cross-examination are not 
admissible for their truth (that is, no extrinsic evidence of their 
factual basis is permitted); their only use is to test the basis for 
the witness’s testimony.96  Second, cross-examination on specific 
acts is heavily influenced by trial incentives; in other words, a 
party will never cross-examine on specific acts unless it can 
benefit at trial from doing so. 
Using the above hypothetical, suppose that Bart (whose 
history of aggression and violence includes domestic abuse) is 
charged with assaulting Arnold (whose history of aggression and 
violence includes regularly starting bar fights).  If Bart attacks 
Arnold’s character for violence, he is limited by current rules to 
the use of reputation or opinion testimony.  The prosecutor is 
 
94 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 186, at 744 (6th ed. 2006). 
95 See FED. R. EVID. 405 (“On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into 
relevant specific instances of conduct.”). 
96 See MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 4.19, at 218–19. 
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unlikely to cross-examine defense witnesses to determine 
whether they are aware that Arnold gained his reputation for 
violence by starting fights in bars; there would be no advantage 
in doing it.  Likewise, if the prosecution attacks Bart’s character 
for violence, Bart gains no advantage by cross-examining 
prosecution character witnesses to determine whether they are 
aware that his reputation for violence came not from bar fights, 
but from domestic abuse.  He gains no advantage from letting 
the jury know that he is a domestic abuser.  The ability to cross-
examine on specific acts under Rule 405 does not compensate 
for the shortcomings of proof inherent in reputation and opinion 
testimony. 
b.  Character Evidence Rules Prior to 2000 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404 provides that “[e]vidence of a 
person’s character or trait of character is not admissible for the 
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a 
particular occasion.”97  Prior to the 2000 amendment, there were 
two exceptions to this rule:  (1) the accused could offer evidence 
of a pertinent trait of his own character (which could be rebutted 
by the prosecution);98 and (2) the accused could offer evidence 
of a pertinent character trait of the victim (which could be 
rebutted by the prosecution).99  What is noteworthy about both 
of these exceptions is that the criminal accused had complete 
control over the introduction of character propensity evidence at 
trial and could selectively use it to bolster his own character or 
attack that of the victim.  There was only one minor (and highly 
particularized) exception to this rule.  When the defense 
introduced factual evidence that the alleged victim of a homicide 
was the first aggressor–for instance, a witness who testified that 
the victim threw the first punch–the prosecution could 
introduce propensity evidence of the victim’s peaceful character 
 
97 FED. R. EVID. 404. 
98 Rule 404(a)(1) pertains to the character of the accused, and it permits, as an 
exception to the general character prohibition, “[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of 
character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same.”  FED. R. 
EVID. 404(a)(1). 
99 Rule 404(a)(2) pertains to the character of the victim, and it permits, as an 
exception to the general character prohibition, “[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of 
character of the alleged victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the 
prosecution to rebut the same.”  FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). 
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to rebut the factual implication that the victim was the 
aggressor.100 
Prior to the 2000 amendment, Rule 404 employed a character 
evidence formula that relied on strict compartmentalization of 
character evidence by category of witness:  the criminal 
defendant, the alleged crime victim, and other witnesses.  Those 
categories, particularly the criminal defendant and the alleged 
crime victim, were akin to apples and oranges.  An attack on an 
apple had to be met with a defense of the apple, but oranges 
were kept strictly out of the picture.  For example, an attack on 
the victim’s character could only be rebutted by defending the 
victim’s character; the prosecution was not permitted to attack 
the defendant’s character for the same pertinent trait.101 
 
100 This exception permits the prosecution to offer “evidence of a character trait 
of peacefulness of the alleged victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case 
to rebut evidence that the alleged victim was the first aggressor.”  Id.  The 
exception, which lets the prosecution introduce victim character evidence even if 
the defense has not, apparently exists “for the special reason that in such cases, the 
dead victim is not available to attest to his own peaceable behavior during the 
encounter in question.”  Uviller, supra note 54, at 857 (emphasis added). 
101 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (pre-2000 version); see also FED. R. EVID. 404 
Advisory Committee’s Note accompanying the Dec. 1, 2000 amendment to Rule 
404(a)(1) (“Current law [(that is, law prior to the 2000 amendment)] does not allow 
the government to introduce negative character evidence as to the accused unless 
the accused introduces evidence of good character.”). 
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TABLE 1 
OPERATION OF SELF-DEFENSE CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
UNDER THE PRE-2000 RULES 404 AND 405102 
 
Rule Defendant Action Prosecution 
Response 
404(a)(1) & 405 Introduce evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of 
defendant’s 
character for 
peacefulness. 
Rebut with 
evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of 
defendant’s 
character for 
violence. 
404(a)(2) & 405 Introduce evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of victim’s 
character for 
violence. 
Rebut with 
evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of 
victim’s character 
for peacefulness. 
404(a)(2) & 405 Introduce factual 
evidence that the 
victim was the first 
aggressor. 
Rebut with 
counter-factual 
evidence. 
Rebut with 
evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of 
victim’s peaceful 
character. 
 
If there was a competitive edge to one side, it was slight, and 
belonged to the defense.  The rule expressly permitted the 
defendant to attack the victim’s character in a self-defense case 
without fear of prosecutorial retaliation against his own 
character.  Indeed, conventional wisdom held that a defendant 
did not put his whole character at issue merely by claiming self-
 
102 Compare TABLE 1, with FED. R. EVID. 404, and FED. R. EVID. 405. 
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defense, because “that would make mincemeat of the limitations 
in Rule 404(a) on the use of character evidence.”103 
c.  Post-2000 Character Evidence Rules 
In 2000, the Advisory Committee made mincemeat of Rule 
404(a)’s limitations by partially removing them.  In response to a 
proposal by the Justice Department to link the character of the 
defendant and the alleged victim, the Committee amended the 
rule.104  Mixing apples and oranges for the first time, the new rule 
permits the prosecution to respond to defense attacks on the 
alleged victim’s character by attacking the defendant’s character 
for the same trait. 
 
103 United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, 795 (7th Cir. 1985). 
104 1 STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG  ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 
§ 404.02[9], at 404-16–404-17 (8th ed. 2002). 
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TABLE 2 
OPERATION OF SELF-DEFENSE CHARACTER EVIDENCE 
UNDER THE POST-2000 RULES 404 AND 405105 
Rule Defendant Action Prosecution 
Response 
404(a)(1) & 405 Introduce evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of 
defendant’s 
character for 
peacefulness. 
Rebut with 
evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of 
defendant’s 
character for 
violence. 
404(a)(2) & 405 Introduce evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of victim’s 
character for 
violence. 
Rebut with 
evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of 
victim’s 
character for 
peacefulness. 
Rebut with 
evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of the 
defendant’s 
character for 
violence. 
404(a)(2) & 405 Introduce factual 
evidence that the 
victim was the first 
aggressor. 
Rebut with 
counter-factual 
evidence. 
Rebut with 
evidence 
(reputation or 
opinion) of 
victim’s peaceful 
character. 
 
105 Compare FED. R. EVID. 404, with FED. R. EVID. 405. 
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C.  Historical and Philosophical Background of Amended Rule 
404(a) 
1.  Historical Background of Amended Rule 404(a) 
The amended Rule 404(a)(1) is predicated on the concept that 
the defense should not receive unfair evidentiary advantages 
over the prosecution at trial.106  A proposed revision of Rule 
404(a) first appeared in the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1997, 
a bill that was never enacted.107  As originally proposed, the 
amendment would have permitted the government to introduce 
evidence of any pertinent trait of the accused’s character in 
response to a character attack on the victim.108 
The Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules considered 
amending Rule 404 in 1997.109  It published the rule as contained 
in the Omnibus Crime Control Act for public comment in 
1998.110  Public comment suggested that permitting the 
prosecution to attack any character trait of the accused could 
result in a potentially overbroad prosecutorial use of character 
evidence.111  Accordingly, the Committee revised the rule to 
limit prosecution counterattacks to the same character trait.112  In 
addition, although the Rule itself was not further amended to 
say this, the Committee notes make clear that attacks on the 
 
106 According to the authors of the Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 
Department of Justice members on the Advisory Committee “convinced a majority 
of Committee members that the government is often prejudiced by a one-way 
presentation of character evidence.  They argued that all too often a defendant 
attacks the character of the victim and the prosecution is not allowed to attack the 
character of the defendant in kind.”  SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 104, § 
404.02[9], at 404-17. 
107 Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1997, S. 3, 105th Cong. § 503 (1997).  With 
respect to Rule 404(a), the bill provided as follows: 
Rule 404(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence is amended by inserting 
before the semicolon the following:  “, or, if an accused offers evidence of a 
pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime, evidence of a pertinent 
trait of character of the accused offered by the prosecution.” 
Id. (emphasis added). 
108 See id. 
109 See Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, Evidence Rules Docket, 
Document No. 1945, Rule 404 (June 23, 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ 
rules/Evidence_Docket.pdf. 
110 Id. 
111 See REPORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EVIDENCE RULES 4 (May 1, 
1999), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/EV05-1999.pdf. 
112 Id. 
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victim’s truthfulness and veracity as a witness under Rule 608 
would not be included within the ambit of Rule 404(a).113  The 
Judicial Conference approved the rule in 1999, the Supreme 
Court approved it in 2000, and it became effective in December 
of 2000.114 
2.  Arguments in Favor of Amended Rule 404(a)(1) 
There are powerful arguments both for and against the 
amended rule.  Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of the 
amendment is based in the philosophical heart of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence, which is that relevant evidence, to the 
greatest extent possible, should be admissible at trial.115  If the 
fact finder is provided with relevant evidence to weigh the 
probability of who was the first aggressor in a violent encounter, 
it should not be presented with evidence from only one side.116  
When a criminal defendant is permitted to attack the character 
of an alleged crime victim, with the law shielding from inquiry 
his own character, the jury at best is presented with an 
incomplete picture of the violent encounter; it is deprived of 
critical evidence that would help it make a better decision 
concerning who started the fight.117 
 
113 See FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note. 
114 See Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules, supra note 109. 
115 According to Rule 402, “All relevant evidence is admissible, except as 
otherwise provided . . . .”  FED. R. EVID. 402.  On the subject of relevance, 
Weinstein has written, “The basic rule of evidence is that evidence must be relevant 
to be admissible.  Much of the rest is detail. . . . The concept defined is, however, 
fundamental to the law of evidence; it is the cornerstone on which any rational 
system of evidence rests.”  2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, 
WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 401.02, at 401-5 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 
2d ed. 1997). 
116 See FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note.  According to the 
Committee: 
The amendment makes clear that the accused cannot attack the alleged 
victim’s character and yet remain shielded from the disclosure of equally 
relevant evidence concerning the same character trait of the accused.  For 
example, in a murder case with a claim of self-defense, the accused, to 
bolster this defense, might offer evidence of the alleged victim’s violent 
disposition.  If the government has evidence that the accused has a violent 
character, but is not allowed to offer this evidence as part of its rebuttal, 
the jury has only part of the information it needs for an informed 
assessment of the probabilities as to who was the initial aggressor. 
Id. 
117 Id. 
 764 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 733 
Another argument for the amendment concerns the integrity 
of the defendant’s presentation to the jury.  In advocating for the 
rule, the Justice Department argued that the former version of 
Rule 404(a) permitted the defendant to mislead the jury by 
attacking the victim’s character without retaliation in kind.118  
According to this argument, such an unrebutted attack sends an 
implicit message that the defendant’s own character is peaceful 
because nothing has been said about it to the jury.119  If the jury 
believes this implicit message, then the rule has disrupted the 
integrity of the judicial process.  The defendant has, in essence, 
been permitted to pull the wool over the jury’s eyes about his 
own character. 
A final argument in favor of the amended rule is that no 
criminal defendant has an absolute right to attack the character 
of any other party at trial.  This is the reasoning underlying the 
statutory English character evidence rules that have been in 
place for well over a century.120  The current English rules permit 
a criminal defendant to attack anyone else’s character if 
necessary for his defense, either by agreement between the 
parties or with leave of the court.121  Whenever the defendant 
 
118 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 104, § 404.02[9], at 404-17 (“What follows, 
according to the DOJ, is that jurors are misled; they think that the defendant must 
have a great character if the government says nothing about it.”). 
119 Id.  A worthwhile comparison can be made to the English Criminal Evidence 
Act of 2003, which permits the prosecution to attack a defendant’s character in 
order to correct a “false impression given by the defendant” either at trial or in 
pretrial investigations or proceedings.  Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101(1)(f) 
(Eng.).  A “false impression” is defined as “an express or implied assertion which is 
apt to give the court or jury a false or misleading impression about the defendant.”  
c. 44, § 105(1)(a).  A defendant can make a misleading impression through his own 
testimony, the testimony of a witness, his conduct, or his dress.  See c. 44, § 105. 
120 Wigmore characterized the English rule as “embodying a kind of English ‘fair 
play’ principle.”  WIGMORE (Tillers rev.), supra note 29, § 63, at 1379 n.7.  The 
original English rule was codified in the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898.  It provided 
that evidence of the criminal accused’s prior criminal offenses could be admitted if 
“the nature or conduct of the defense is such as to involve imputations on the 
character of the prosecutor or the witnesses for the prosecution.”  Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36, § 1 (Eng.), quoted in WIGMORE (Tillers 
rev.), supra note 29, § 63, at 1379 n.7. 
121 Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 100 (Eng.), which states: 
(1) In criminal proceedings evidence of the bad character of a person other 
than the defendant is admissible if and only if– 
(a) it is important explanatory evidence, 
(b) it has substantial probative value in relation to a matter which– 
(i) is a matter in issue in the proceedings, and 
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attacks a prosecution witness or suggests prosecutorial 
misconduct, however, the prosecution is allowed to 
counterattack by presenting evidence of the defendant’s bad 
character. 122  Significantly, the English counterattack rule also 
 
(ii) is of substantial importance in the context of the case as a 
whole, or 
(c) all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being 
admissible. 
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) evidence is important explanatory 
evidence if– 
(a) without it, the court or jury would find it impossible or difficult 
properly to understand other evidence in the case, and 
(b) its value for understanding the case as a whole is substantial. 
(3) In assessing the probative value of evidence for the purposes of 
subsection (1)(b) the court must have regard to the following factors (and 
to any others it considers relevant)– 
(a) the nature and number of the events, or other things, to which the 
evidence relates; 
(b) when those events or things are alleged to have happened or 
existed; 
(c) where– 
(i) the evidence is evidence of a person’s misconduct, and 
(ii) it is suggested that the evidence has probative value by reason 
of similarity between that misconduct and other alleged 
misconduct, the nature and extent of the similarities and the 
dissimilarities between each of the alleged instances of 
misconduct; 
(d) where– 
(i) the evidence is evidence of a person’s misconduct, 
(ii) it is suggested that that person is also responsible for the 
misconduct charged, and 
(iii) the identity of the person responsible for the misconduct 
charged is disputed, the extent to which the evidence shows or 
tends to show that the same person was responsible each time. 
(4) Except where subsection (1)(c) applies, evidence of the bad character 
of a person other than the defendant must not be given without leave of the 
court. 
122 See Philip Plowden, Making Sense of Character Evidence, 155 NEW L.J., No. 
7159, at 47–50 (Jan. 14, 2005).  The primary applicable character evidence provision 
pertaining to defendants is contained in section 101 of the Criminal Justice Act of 
2003.  See id.  It states as follows: 
(1) In criminal proceedings evidence of the defendant’s bad character is 
admissible if, but only if– 
(a) all parties to the proceedings agree to the evidence being 
admissible, 
(b) the evidence is adduced by the defendant himself or is given in 
answer to a question asked by him in cross-examination and intended 
to elicit it, 
(c) it is important explanatory evidence, 
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applies to attacks that occur outside the courtroom, such as when 
a criminal defendant attacks the character of another person 
during a police interrogation.123  In short, the English rule 
imposes a price on the defendant’s conduct but does not prevent 
it. 
Similarly, one can argue that the amended Rule 404(a) takes 
nothing away from a criminal defendant.  If the defendant 
believes he needs to introduce negative character evidence 
against the alleged crime victim, he may do so.  He must, 
however, be prepared to pay the price.  According to this 
argument, the amended Rule 404(a) does nothing more or less 
than alter the cost-benefit analysis for the accused.124  The 
question is whether this is an acceptable price to impose on a 
criminal defendant. 
3.  Arguments Against Amended Rule 404(a)(1) 
In the face of arguments for the amended rule, there are also 
strong arguments against it.  First, in the federal system, the 
empirical necessity for the amended Rule 404(a) is 
questionable.125  Homicide and assault cases are the primary 
 
(d) it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant 
and the prosecution, 
(e) it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter 
in issue between the defendant and a co-defendant, 
(f) it is evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant, 
or 
(g) the defendant has made an attack on another person’s character. 
(2) Sections 102 to 106 contain provision supplementing subsection (1). 
(3) The court must not admit evidence under subsection (1)(d) or (g) if, on 
an application by the defendant to exclude it, it appears to the court that 
the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the 
fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it. 
(4) On an application to exclude evidence under subsection (3) the court 
must have regard, in particular, to the length of time between the matters 
to which that evidence relates and the matters which form the subject of 
the offence charged. 
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 101 (Eng.). 
123 Plowden, supra note 122, at 47–50. 
124 Cf. SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 104, § 404.02[8], at 404-16 (“Now, defense 
counsel must think harder about whether to attack the victim’s character–the risk 
to the defendant is greater than before.”). 
125 See id.  (“So it is questionable whether the amendment was needed to 
‘protect’ the government from negative inferences in what is probably a small 
number of cases.”). 
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concern of state courts,126 not federal district courts.127  The 
likelihood is small indeed that federal prosecutors faced 
significant or insurmountable problems with the previous 
version of the rule.128 
Not only is the rule of dubious empirical necessity in a federal 
system largely unconcerned with common law crimes against the 
person, but it may also be superfluous within the context of Rule 
404 itself.  In amending the rule, the Committee minimized a 
tremendous advantage already available under the rules to the 
prosecution at trial:  the introduction of specific acts under Rule 
404(b) for noncharacter purposes such as motive, opportunity, 
absence of mistake, intent, and so forth.129 
In the hands of an experienced and knowledgeable 
prosecutor, Rule 404(b) takes away much of the protection that 
Rule 404(a) grants to a criminal accused.  Rule 404(b) is 
powerful for three reasons.  First, the jury is likely to draw 
impermissible character inferences from specific-acts evidence 
 
126 For example, according to U.S. Department of Justice Statistics, there were 
590,300 arrests for violent crime in 2004.  See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice 
Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Key Facts at a Glance, Four Measures of 
Serious Violent Crime, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/4meastab.htm 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2008).  However, only 2962 federal district court cases that year 
involved violent crimes.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau 
of Justice Statistics, Defendants in Cases Concluded in U.S. District Court, 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/tables/fedtyptab.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
127 Cf. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.2(b), at 10–14 
(2d ed. 1999) (noting that the federal system is responsible for less than two percent 
of the total criminal prosecutions in the United States and less than four percent of 
felony prosecutions). 
128 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 104, § 404.02[9], at 404-19. 
129 According to Rule 404(b): 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident . . . . 
FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
 The Advisory Committee briefly addressed the introduction of specific-acts 
evidence under Rule 404(b) in its notes to the 2000 amendment to Rule 404(a)(1), 
asserting that without the amendment, the government would be subjected to an 
evidentiary disadvantage, “even if evidence of the accused’s prior violent acts is 
admitted under Rule 404(b), because such evidence can be admitted only for 
limited purposes and not to show action in conformity with the accused’s character 
on a specific occasion.”  FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note.  This brief 
discussion, however, minimizes the impact of Rule 404(b) evidence at trial. 
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offered under Rule 404(b) for noncharacter purposes.130  Second, 
Rule 404(b) operates independently of Rule 404(a); a prosecutor 
does not have to wait for the defendant to bring his character 
into play in order to introduce evidence under 404(b).131  Third, 
Rule 404(b) permits prosecutorial evidence of specific acts, even 
as the criminal defendant is confined to presenting reputation or 
opinion evidence within the constraints of Rule 405.132  When 
one considers the prosecutorial advantages, flexibility, and 
power of Rule 404(b), it becomes apparent that the class of cases 
is narrow indeed in which the previous version of Rule 404(a) 
presented an actual problem for prosecutors. 
The amendment’s problems extend beyond its questionable 
justifications to its impact on the rights of criminal defendants at 
trial.  In attempting to achieve balance, the amendment as 
written actually tips the evidentiary scales against some criminal 
defendants in a way that interferes with the defendant’s ability to 
present a meaningful defense. 
The amendment did away with a workable, predictable rule 
that represented a rough balance between the interests of the 
prosecution and the needs of the defense.  While it is true that 
the character evidence rules have not historically been models of 
logical clarity or internal consistency, experience has proved 
their value.  Justice Robert Jackson’s famous statement in 
Michelson v. United States still rings true today: 
 We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and 
the profession that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and 
full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational 
advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned 
counterprivilege to the other.  But somehow it has proved a 
workable even if clumsy system when moderated by 
discretionary controls in the hands of a wise and strong trial 
court.  To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque 
structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance 
between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.
133
 
Predictability and workability are evidentiary qualities not 
lightly to be gainsaid.  In the absence of a compelling reason to 
do so, it makes little sense to pull “one misshapen stone” out of 
 
130 See SALTZBURG ET AL., supra note 104, § 404.02[9], at 404-19. 
131 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
132 Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(b), with FED. R. EVID. 405. 
133 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948). 
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the evidentiary edifice, particularly when imbalance or even 
injustice to a particular group of defendants is likely to result. 
Not only did the pre-2000 version of Rule 404 represent the 
collective wisdom of the common law, but it also had 
constitutional dimensions.  The principle that a criminal 
defendant should be able to enhance his defense by attacking the 
character of the alleged victim was “so deeply imbedded in our 
jurisprudence as to assume almost constitutional proportions 
and to override doubts of the basic relevancy of the evidence.”134 
Admittedly, the amended Rule 404(a)(1) negatively impacts 
only a narrow class of defendants in a small number of cases:  
defendants of violent character who have a legitimate claim of 
self-defense against aggressor-victims of violent character, where 
there are no eyewitnesses or supporting forensic evidence.135  
The effect on those defendants, however, is to effectually 
deprive them of a defense tactic–the ability to attack the 
character of the alleged crime victim without bringing the 
defendant’s own character into question–that has been 
available to the majority of criminal defendants throughout the 
entire history of American jurisprudence.136 
The bigger question, however, is whether the amended rule 
actually deprives defendants of a meaningful defense at trial.  
The Supreme Court has made clear that while state and federal 
rule makers have broad authority to create exclusionary rules of 
evidence at criminal trials,137 they may not do so by creating rules 
that deprive a defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present 
a complete defense, infringe upon a weighty interest of the 
accused, or are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purpose they 
are designed to serve.138 
The likelihood of the Supreme Court declaring amended Rule 
404(a) unconstitutional is slim.139  The rule does not prevent the 
 
134 See FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note. 
135 For a more thorough discussion of this, see infra Part III.B.2. 
136 See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
137 Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324 (2006). 
138 See id. (citing United States v. Sheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998); Crane v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)). 
139 See Williams v. Lord, 996 F.2d 1481 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1120 
(1994).  In Williams, the appellant, a prostitute, was convicted of murder for 
stabbing a customer to death.  She claimed self-defense.  During trial, she learned 
that the alleged victim was the subject of a prior rape investigation.  She attempted 
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defendant from testifying in his own defense,140 introducing 
exculpatory evidence,141 or even attacking the victim’s character 
in his own defense; the rule simply imposes an unpalatable cost-
benefit balance on the criminal defendant. 
Nevertheless, the amended rule presents the violent criminal 
defendant who has a meritorious claim to self-defense with a 
Hobson’s choice:  he can attack the alleged victim’s character 
and expose himself to certain counterattack and a probable 
conviction, or he can remain silent on the issue of the alleged 
victim’s character and face a likely conviction.142  Neither of 
these choices is likely to be found unconstitutional by the 
Supreme Court, which historically has displayed little sympathy 
for the “hard choices” the adversarial system imposes on 
criminal defendants.143  While the character choices raised by the 
 
to introduce evidence of the rape investigation, but the judge denied the motion, 
because New York evidentiary law only permitted evidence of the alleged victim’s 
violent character if it was known to the defendant at the time of the incident.  
Williams challenged a district court’s denial of her habeas corpus petition, and the 
court affirmed, holding that New York’s evidentiary rule limiting admission of 
relevant proof where state interests outweighed the defendant’s right to present 
exculpatory evidence was neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to New York’s 
legitimate state interests.  Id. at 1483–84.  The Advisory Committee’s stated 
purposes for amending Rule 404(a)(1) would probably be enough to satisfy the 
Court.  See also Sheffer, 523 U.S. at 309 n.5, in which the Court used the drafter’s 
notes of Military Rule of Evidence 707 (citing interests similar to those stated in 
FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note) to hold that the rule allowing 
exclusion of certain relevant evidence was not arbitrary or disproportionate in 
achieving its goals, even though it precluded a criminal accused from introducing 
exculpatory polygraph evidence at trial. 
140 See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987) (holding that a criminal 
accused has the right to testify on his own behalf at trial under the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory 
Process Clause, and the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against compulsory self-
incrimination). 
141 See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) (noting that due process 
requires that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense and observing that “this group of constitutional privileges delivers 
exculpatory evidence into the hands of the accused, thereby protecting the innocent 
from erroneous conviction and ensuring the integrity of our criminal justice 
system”). 
142 See infra Part III.B. 
143 See, e.g., Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (2005) (a criminal defendant may 
waive constitutional rights as part of the plea bargaining process); McKune v. Lile, 
536 U.S. 24 (2002) (a criminal defendant has the right to participate or refuse to 
participate in proceedings before a clemency board, where testimony could 
incriminate him or silence be held against him); Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 
U.S. 386 (1987) (a criminal defendant may waive the right to bring a civil suit 
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federal character evidence rules may not rise to constitutional 
dimensions, they nonetheless represent, in their impact, a de 
facto exclusionary rule for certain defendants that cries out for 
corrective action. 
II 
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE 
The previous section of this Article has demonstrated some 
deficiencies of the amended Rule 404(a)(1).  Additionally, the 
combination of the amended Rule 404(a)(1) and the method of 
proof constraints of Rule 405 may interfere not only with the 
defendant’s ability to present a defense, but also with the jury’s 
duty to decide the probable first aggressor in a self-defense 
case.144 
I propose further amending Rule 404 in order to recognize 
that the jury is entitled to the most complete picture possible in a 
self-defense case where the identity of the first aggressor is at 
issue.  The proposed amendment, Rule 404(c), would apply 
exclusively to self-defense cases.  Rule 404(c) is an amalgam of 
character evidence rules from three states:  Missouri, 
Massachusetts, and California.  Although there are several 
jurisdiction-specific approaches to character evidence, I have 
focused on Missouri, Massachusetts, and California because of 
the doctrinal clarity of their positions and their combined utility 
in forming a new character rule.145  This section begins by 
 
against the government in return for a dismissal of charges); Williams v. Florida, 399 
U.S. 78 (1970) (a state may require a criminal defendant to provide advance notice 
of alibi witnesses); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967) (a criminal defendant who 
testifies on his own behalf may face impeachment for a prior criminal record); 
Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896) (a criminal defendant may elect to testify and 
therefore waive his privilege against self-incrimination). 
144 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
145 For an excellent discussion of the various approaches employed by United 
States jurisdictions, see Kleiss, supra note 55, at 1452–60, and Andrew G. Scott, 
Note, Exclusive Admissibility of Specific Act Evidence in Initial-Aggressor Self-
Defense Cases:  Ensuring Equity Within the Adjutant Framework, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REV. 237, 244–50 (2006).  Some states have adopted more permissive evidence rules 
that allow for proof establishing the initial aggressor’s identity.  Wyoming, for 
example, has legislatively altered its Rule 405 to provide that in cases involving the 
defense attacking the victim’s character under Rule 404(a)(2), the defense is 
entitled to present evidence of specific acts.  See WYO. R. EVID. 405(b) (“In cases in 
which character or a trait of character of a person is an essential element of a 
charge, claim, or defense, or is in issue under Rule 404(a)(2), proof may also be 
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discussing the character evidence rules of these three states, 
extracting elements from each that help accomplish two 
objectives:  (1) assisting the jury in determining the identity of 
the first aggressor; and (2) preserving the defendant’s ability to 
present an effective defense.  The section concludes by 
proposing an amended rule based on those elements. 
A.  Character Evidence and Self-Defense in Missouri, California, 
and Massachusetts 
Long before the Rules Advisory Committee amended Rule 
404, Missouri (a common law evidence jurisdiction) and 
California (a code evidence jurisdiction) already had evidentiary 
schemes that precluded the defendant from attacking an alleged 
crime victim’s character with impunity.146  In 2005, Massachusetts 
judicially adopted a rule permitting the defendant to introduce 
specific acts of character evidence in self-defense cases to 
support a claim that the victim was the first aggressor.147  The 
approaches taken by these jurisdictions regarding the use of 
character evidence in self-defense cases are valuable in 
formulating a proposed rule that would enhance the search for 
truth in self-defense cases while preserving the defendant’s right 
to present an effective defense. 
 
made of specific instances of his conduct.”).  It should be noted, however, that 
Wyoming has not yet adopted a version of the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404(a)(1), so there currently is no opportunity for prosecutorial 
counterattack.  See WYO. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).  Illinois has a common law rule very 
similar to Massachusetts’s newly adopted rule in the Adjutant case, allowing 
evidence of the alleged victim’s specific acts of prior violence of which the 
defendant was unaware at the time of the accident.  See Scott, supra, at 246–49.  
Some states have declared that specific-acts evidence is an “essential element” of a 
self-defense claim and have permitted specific acts under their versions of Rule 405.  
See id. at 245–46.  Other jurisdictions restrict evidence of the alleged victim’s 
specific acts to prior convictions for violent crimes, an approach known as the 
Connecticut rule.  See id.  Another approach, termed the District of Columbia Rule, 
limits specific-acts evidence to homicide cases.  Id. at 246; see also Kleiss, supra note 
55, at 1463–64 (proposing an amendment to FED. R. EVID. 405 that would permit 
evidence of all relevant prior specific acts in homicide cases).  The final approach 
permits the defendant’s use of specific-acts evidence, but only after notice to the 
prosecution.  See Scott, supra, at 246. 
146 See, e.g., State v. Waller, 816 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Mo. 1991). 
147 Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2005). 
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1.  Missouri 
Missouri has traditionally adhered to the position that a 
criminal defendant is entitled to present evidence of the victim’s 
violent or turbulent character to support a claim of self-defense 
at trial.148  This position is consistent with the common law and 
the pre-2000 Federal Rules.  In cases where the violent or 
turbulent character of the alleged victim is not known to the 
defendant at the time of the violent encounter, Missouri 
evidentiary law permits the defendant to introduce general 
reputation testimony, but not specific acts, in proof of the 
victim’s character.149 
The Missouri rule, however, differs in one critical aspect from 
the majority of common law jurisdictions and the pre-2000 
Federal Rules of Evidence:  in Missouri, the defendant cannot 
attack the alleged victim’s character with impunity.  In 1939, the 
Missouri Supreme Court held that when a criminal accused 
“tenders the factual issue of the bad character of the victim of his 
assault to substantiate his plea of self-defense, he thereby . . . 
opens up for inquiry all evidence of like quality having probative 
value on the merits of said ultimate factual issue.”150  The court 
reached this conclusion for several reasons:  (1) in determining 
the probability of a first aggressor in a homicide or assault case, 
the same reasoning should apply not only to evidence offered by 
the accused, but also to evidence offered by the prosecution in 
rebuttal; (2) both the defendant and the state are entitled to a 
fair trial; and (3) impartial justice could not be dispensed when 
one side is allowed “to present a given type of evidence bearing 
 
148 Waller, 816 S.W.2d at 214 (discussing Missouri precedent and stating, “On the 
issue of self-defense there can be no doubt of the rule that evidence of the 
deceased’s reputation for turbulence and violence is admissible as relevant to show 
who was the aggressor and whether a reasonable apprehension of danger existed; 
but such evidence must be proved by general reputation testimony, not specific acts 
of violence . . . .”). 
149 See id. at 214–15.  According to the Waller court, there are a number of 
reasons for excluding specific acts at trial:  (1) a single act may have been 
exceptional, unusual, and uncharacteristic; (2) numerous collateral issues could be 
raised; (3) collateral issues might cloud the real issues and confuse the jury; (4) the 
state cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut every specific prior act of violence of a 
deceased victim; and (5) since the state cannot introduce evidence of the 
defendant’s past acts of violence, the defendant should not be permitted to benefit 
from evidence of specific acts of the victim.  Id. at 215. 
150 State v. Robinson, 130 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Mo. 1939). 
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upon an ultimate factual issue while at the same time denying to 
his adversary the right to present his version of said issue by 
evidence of equal inherent quality.”151 
Thus, in Missouri, the criminal accused holds the key to the 
introduction of evidence pertaining both to his own and to the 
victim’s character.  In cases where the character of the victim 
was not known to the accused prior to the violent encounter, the 
accused is limited to general reputation testimony of character.152  
If the accused decides to attack the victim’s character for 
turbulence or violence, the state may respond with general 
reputation evidence pertaining to the accused’s character for 
turbulence or violence.153  Missouri maintains the historic 
common law antipathy towards evidence of specific acts to prove 
character at trial.154 
2.  California 
California’s evidence code provides maximum opportunity for 
a criminal defendant to present evidence pertaining to the 
alleged victim’s character in a self-defense case, while at the 
same time ensuring the prosecution can present a balanced view 
of the probabilities.  The general character evidence provision of 
the California code is quite similar to the general character 
evidence prohibition of the common law and the Federal Rules 
of Evidence:  unless it meets an exception, evidence of a person’s 
character or trait of character (whether proved by reputation, 
opinion, or specific acts) is inadmissible to prove conduct on a 
specific occasion.155 
 
151 Id. at 531. 
152 Waller, 816 S.W.2d at 214. 
153 Robinson, 130 S.W.2d at 532. 
154 Waller, 816 S.W.2d at 214.  There does appear to be some authority in 
Missouri for the proposition that specific acts can be used to prove character.  See 
William A. Schroeder, Evidence Issues in Assault and Homicide Cases Where Self-
Defense Is Claimed, 58 J. MO. B. 70, 73 (Mar.–Apr. 2002) (construing the case of 
State v. Oates, 12 S.W.3d 307 (Mo. 2002), in which the defendant elicited evidence of 
the alleged victim’s specific acts on direct examination to support the inference that 
the victim was the first aggressor).  However, as a more recent appellate case 
demonstrates, the general rule in Missouri remains that reputation evidence is the 
appropriate method to prove character.  See Kuehne v. State, 107 S.W.3d 285 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 2003). 
155 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1101 (West 2007). 
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One such exception is found in section 1103 of the California 
Evidence Code, which provides that in a criminal case, the 
defendant can introduce evidence of the victim’s character or 
trait of character to prove the victim’s conduct in conformity 
with the character trait.156  Although this provision of the Code 
originally limited the defendant to offering reputation or opinion 
testimony, the Code was eventually amended to permit the 
defendant to offer evidence of the victim’s specific acts as well.157  
Prior to 1991, the prosecution could defend against such an 
attack only by bolstering the victim’s character with opinion 
testimony, reputation evidence, or specific instances of conduct. 
In 1991, section 1103 was amended to permit a prosecution 
counterattack in cases involving the character trait of violence.158  
If the defendant attacks the victim’s character for violence, 
section 1103 allows the prosecution to introduce evidence of the 
defendant’s character for violence or trait of character for 
violence tending to show that the violence was adduced by the 
defendant.159  The prosecution, like the defendant, may use 
evidence of reputation, opinion, or specific acts.160  The amended 
section 1103 has survived a challenge under the California 
 
156 Id. § 1103(a).  This provision provides as follows: 
 (a) In a criminal action, evidence of the character or a trait of character 
(in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific 
instances of conduct) of the victim of the crime for which the defendant is 
being prosecuted is not made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence 
is: 
 (1) Offered by the defendant to prove conduct of the victim in 
conformity with the character or trait of character. 
 (2) Offered by the prosecution to rebut evidence adduced by the 
defendant under paragraph (1). 
Id. 
157 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a) Historical and Statutory Notes. 
158 See id. 
159 Section 1103(b) of the California Evidence Code states: 
 (b) In a criminal action, evidence of the defendant’s character for 
violence or trait of character for violence (in the form of an opinion, 
evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of conduct) is not 
made inadmissible by Section 1101 if the evidence is offered by the 
prosecution to prove conduct of the defendant in conformity with the 
character or trait of character and is offered after evidence that the victim 
had a character for violence or a trait of character tending to show violence 
has been adduced by the defendant under paragraph (1) of subdivision (a). 
Id. § 1103(b). 
160 See id. 
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constitution and remains a viable, if seldom-used, provision of 
the evidentiary code.161 
Under the California Code, the defendant still holds the 
traditional key to character evidence.  Significantly, he has 
access to all three methods of character evidence to prove the 
alleged victim’s character for violence.162  Once the defendant 
attacks the victim’s character for violence, the California Code 
gives the prosecution considerable flexibility in response:  the 
prosecution can use the same types of evidence against the 
defendant to prove that the defendant instigated the violent 
encounter.163 
3.  Massachusetts 
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recently held 
that in self-defense cases where the identity of the first aggressor 
is at issue, the defendant is entitled to attack the alleged victim’s 
character for violence by using evidence of specific instances of 
conduct.164  In a thorough opinion that closely examines the 
various common law and code approaches to self-defense and 
character evidence, the Massachusetts court reasoned that 
because specific-acts evidence is the most convincing method of 
proving character, it is the best method for determining the 
probable first aggressor in a homicide or assault case.165  In a 
fascinating reversal of the traditional common law and federal 
approach to the problem, the court specifically rejected the use 
of reputation evidence for this purpose because it is frequently 
based on rumor or unreliable hearsay sources.166  Likewise, the 
court rejected the use of opinion testimony for similar reasons.  
According to the court, “Juries should have the ability to draw 
their own inferences in assessing the bearing of the victim’s prior 
 
161 See People v. Blanco, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that 
provision of CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(b) that permitted prosecution to rebut 
defendant’s character attack on victim with a character attack on the defendant did 
not violate defendant’s due process rights). 
162 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103(a). 
163 Id. § 1103(b). 
164 Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1 (Mass. 2005). 
165 See id. at 13–14. 
166 See id. 
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violent conduct on the probability that he was the first 
aggressor.”167 
The court recognized the traditional arguments against using 
evidence of the victim’s specific acts, essentially reducing them 
to two major issues:  the potential to confuse the jury with 
collateral issues, and the potential to prejudice the jury against 
the victim through the suggestion that the victim received his just 
deserts because of his bad character.168  Noting that the evidence 
could be offered only on the narrow issue of determining 
whether the victim was the first aggressor, the court expressed 
confidence in the ability of trial judges to craft appropriate 
instructions and the ability of juries to understand the 
appropriate use of the evidence.169  To provide further 
protection to the prosecution’s case, the court mandated the use 
of timely, specific pretrial notice to the court and prosecutor and 
required the prosecution, in turn, to provide notice to the 
defendant of rebuttal evidence.170 
On the issue of whether the prosecution would be entitled to 
counterattack with evidence of the defendant’s prior specific acts 
of violence, the court declined to rule.171  It did, however, 
favorably note the 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 
404(a)(1) and its purpose of “making clear that the accused 
cannot simultaneously attack the alleged victim’s character and 
yet remain shielded from the disclosure of equally relevant 
evidence concerning his own same character trait.”172  It seems 
likely that the court would permit the prosecution to introduce 
specific instances of the defendant’s conduct to rebut an attack 
on the victim’s character in a self-defense case. 
The Massachusetts rule, in summary, represents a radical 
departure from the traditional character evidence rules 
pertaining to self-defense cases.173  Rejecting the traditional 
 
167 Id. at 14. 
168 See id. at 11–12. 
169 Id. at 13. 
170 Id. at 14. 
171 Id. at 14 n.19. 
172 Id. 
173 This departure from traditional evidentiary standards in Massachusetts has 
been a cause of concern for scholarly commentators.  See, e.g., Scott, supra note 145 
(identifying the prospective difficulties at trial posed by the court’s lack of guidance 
in the Adjutant case); Hallie White Speight, Note, Hard Cases Make Bad Law:  
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requirement for reputation or opinion testimony, the court 
instead held that the defendant must use specific-acts evidence 
to prove the alleged victim’s character and, in turn, the 
probability that the victim was the first aggressor.  The court also 
mandated the use of specific, timely pretrial notice to the 
prosecution and the court. 
B.  Comparison, Synthesis, and Proposal 
1.  Comparison 
The three jurisdictions discussed in the preceding section 
provide a useful roadmap for a proposed rule amendment.  Each 
of the jurisdictional approaches offers unique characteristics 
from which to synthesize a new approach. 
There are two primary strengths of the Massachusetts rule.  
The first is the recognition not only of the essential reliability 
and validity of specific-acts evidence in a self-defense case, but 
also the ability of judges and juries to use the evidence properly 
at trial.174  The second is the procedural mandate for specific, 
timely notice to the prosecution and the court of the evidence 
intended for use at trial.175  This notice permits the trial judge to 
sift through the collateral issues and marginally relevant specific 
acts that might otherwise confuse the jury at trial and consume 
its time.  A reciprocal obligation to the prosecution ensures the 
absence of surprise to the defendant at trial.176 
There are also two major drawbacks to the Massachusetts 
rule.  The first is its total exclusion of reputation and opinion 
testimony.177  Although these are weaker forms of proof than 
evidence of specific conduct, they are, nonetheless, not without 
value.178  In some circumstances, reputation or opinion testimony 
may be the only available methods to prove the character of an 
alleged crime victim in a self-defense case.  Because reputation 
 
Commonwealth v. Adjutant and Evidence of the Deceased’s Propensity for Violence 
in Self-Defense Cases in Massachusetts, 86 B.U. L. REV. 793 (2006) (arguing that the 
Massachusetts rule now permits the defendant to put the victim on trial). 
174 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
175 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
176 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
177 See supra notes 164–67 and accompanying text. 
178 See generally supra Part I.B.4.a. (discussing methods of proving character at 
trial). 
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and opinion are a less precise form of proof than specific acts,179 
a criminal defendant may well decide it is in his best interest to 
present a fuzzier picture of the alleged victim to the jury.  Strict 
exclusion of reputation and opinion testimony deprives the 
defendant of an important tactical choice at trial. 
The second weakness of the Massachusetts rule is the 
uncertainty as to prosecution options in rebuttal when the 
defense has attacked the character of the alleged crime victim.180  
This weakness could lead to confusion at trial and, eventually, 
contradictory guidance from lower appellate courts.181 
The Missouri rule emphasizes the traditional common law 
value that the defendant holds the key to the use of character 
evidence at trial:  his own, and that of the victim.182  This permits 
the defendant a great deal of flexibility in his defense and 
precludes the prosecution from trying the defendant for his life’s 
character in its case in chief.  Another advantage of the Missouri 
approach is its deeply rooted adherence to the principle of 
balance in determining the identity of the first aggressor in a 
homicide or assault case.  The Missouri rule does not permit the 
defendant to present a one-sided view of the character 
probabilities with impunity; if evidence of the defendant’s 
violent or turbulent character is available, the prosecution can 
introduce it in rebuttal to paint a more complete picture for the 
jury.183 
Like the Massachusetts rule, the Missouri rule suffers from 
the forced preclusion of other valuable methods of proving 
character.  Although some case law appears to have permitted 
the use of specific-acts evidence to prove character in a self-
defense case,184 prevailing Missouri practice is that reputation 
evidence is required to prove character in self-defense cases 
when the identity of the first aggressor is at issue.185 
 
179 See supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. 
180 See Scott, supra note 145, at 258–59. 
181 Cf. id. at 248–49 (discussing some of the subsequent difficulties with the 
Illinois Supreme Court’s failure to provide clear guidance concerning the 
introduction of specific-acts evidence in self-defense cases in People v. Lynch, 470 
N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. 1984)). 
182 See supra notes 152–154 and accompanying text. 
183 See supra notes 150–151 and accompanying text. 
184 See supra note 154. 
185 See supra note 154. 
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Perhaps the most complete rule is section 1103 of the 
California Evidence Code.  It preserves the common law 
tradition that the defendant holds the key to the introduction of 
character evidence.186  Unlike the common law, however, section 
1103 lets the defendant choose from all three methods of proving 
character:  reputation, opinion, or specific acts of conduct.187  
The 1991 amendment to section 1103 grants reciprocal rights to 
the prosecution in cases involving violence, provided that the 
defendant has first attacked the character of the crime victim.188 
Section 1103 does not, however, contain a notice requirement, 
nor does it mandate a pretrial hearing to determine the 
relevance or reliability of the evidence.189  Although the 
evidence is subject to a balancing test similar to that found in 
Federal Rule of Evidence 403,190 there are no procedural 
guarantees within section 1103 itself that would avoid 
unnecessary collateral litigation or the confusion of issues that 
might arise from the presentation of specific-acts evidence that 
has not been screened by a judge.191  Furthermore, neither the 
rule nor interpretative case law speaks to the issue of symmetry 
in the presentation of rebuttal evidence by the prosecution.192  In 
 
186 See supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
187 See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
188 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. 
189 See generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103 (West 2007). 
190 Compare id. § 352 (permitting the trial court to exclude evidence if “its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will 
(a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue 
prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury”), with FED. R. EVID. 
403 (permitting the trial court to exclude evidence if “its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, 
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence”). 
191 See generally CAL. EVID. CODE § 1103. 
192 Section 1103 of the California Evidence Code says nothing about requiring 
the prosecution and defense to use the same method (i.e., reputation, opinion, or 
specific acts) to prove character that the other side used.  See generally id.  In the 
relatively few reported cases construing the 1991 amendment to section 1103, it 
appears that the prosecution and defense used the same method to prove character.  
See, e.g., People v. Koontz, 46 P.3d 335, 362–63 (Cal. 2002) (defendant offered 
specific-acts and reputation evidence concerning the violent character of the victim, 
and the prosecution rebutted with specific-acts evidence (conviction for armed 
robbery) and reputation evidence concerning defendant’s character for violence); 
People v. Myers, 56 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (defendant offered 
specific-acts evidence regarding character of the arresting police officer and the 
State countered with specific-acts evidence pertaining to defendant’s character).  In 
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other words, if the defendant introduces reputation evidence 
pertaining to the victim, it is not clear whether the prosecution is 
limited to the reputation evidence pertaining to the defendant, 
or whether the prosecution can use any of the three methods of 
proving character in rebuttal. 
2.  Synthesis 
My proposed amendment to Rule 404 synthesizes ideas from 
the Federal Rules of Evidence and the unique approaches taken 
by Missouri, Massachusetts, and California.  Accordingly, I 
suggest the following components as necessary to an amended 
Rule 404. 
First, the rule should preserve the historic right of the 
defendant to hold the keys of character evidence at trial, both 
for himself and for the victim.193  The choice to raise character 
evidence in a self-defense case must belong to the criminal 
defendant, and the consequences of doing so, i.e., prosecutorial 
counterattack on the defendant’s character, must be clear. 
Second, the rule should ensure that the jury has the optimal 
opportunity to determine the truth in a self-defense case where 
the identity of the first aggressor is at issue.194  If the defendant is 
entitled to attack the victim’s character for violence or 
turbulence, the prosecution should not suffer from compelled 
silence if the defendant shares the same character traits.  The 
purpose of the evidence is to help the jury determine what 
happened, not to confer an unfair advantage on either side. 
Third, the rule should provide both sides with maximum 
flexibility in methods of proof.195  The defendant should be able 
to introduce evidence of specific acts, reputation, or opinion:  
whichever would most benefit his case.  Conversely, the 
prosecution should be able to rebut with any available method of 
proof and should not be limited to a symmetrical method of 
proof that limits its presentation to what the defendant has 
chosen. 
 
another case, it is unclear exactly what type of character evidence the defendant 
offered to prove the victim’s violent character, although the prosecution responded 
with specific-acts and reputation evidence to prove the defendant’s character.  See 
People v. Blanco, 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 176 (Cal. App. 1992). 
193 See generally supra Part I.B.3.a. 
194 See supra Part I.C.2. 
195 See supra Part I.B.4.a. 
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Fourth, because of the potential problems associated with 
using character evidence to establish the identity of the first 
aggressor, the rule should require timely, specific notice to the 
court and opposing counsel of any such evidence at trial.196  
Regardless of the method of proof counsel intend to use, the 
court should conduct a pretrial hearing to determine whether the 
evidence is relevant, reliable, and conducive to the search for 
truth at trial.  A workable and familiar procedure already exists 
in Rule 412 to provide for the admission of specific instances of 
prior sexual conduct in sexual assault cases,197 and I recommend 
tailoring it to fit the proposed Rule 404(c). 
Fifth, in recognition of the relative positions of the defendant 
and the prosecution at trial,198 the rule should provide for the 
exclusion of evidence against the defendant that is not more 
probative than unfairly prejudicial to the defendant.  This 
provision, similar to that used in Rule 609 to weigh the 
admission of convictions against the accused,199 recognizes that 
 
196 See Commonwealth v. Adjutant, 824 N.E.2d 1, 14 (Mass. 2005) (requiring 
notice before using specific-acts character evidence at trial). 
197 The procedure in Rule 412 provides as follows: 
(c) Procedure to determine admissibility. 
(1) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision (b) must– 
(A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial specifically 
describing the evidence and stating the purpose for which it is 
offered unless the court, for good cause requires a different time 
for filing or permits filing during trial; and 
(B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the alleged victim or, 
when appropriate, the alleged victim’s guardian or representative. 
(2) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court must conduct a 
hearing in camera and afford the victim and parties a right to attend 
and be heard.  The motion, related papers, and the record of the 
hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court orders 
otherwise. 
FED. R. EVID. 412(c). 
198 See supra notes 49–53 and accompanying text. 
199 Rule 609’s balancing provision provides that “evidence that an accused has 
been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the 
probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
accused.”  FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).  This balancing test differs from the typical 
admissibility standards found in Rule 403, which provides for the presumptive 
admissibility of evidence unless its probative value is significantly outweighed by 
the risk of unfair prejudice.  See FED. R. EVID. 403.  The different balancing test for 
the criminal accused in Rule 609 exists because: 
Part of the problem for the accused is that using prior convictions to 
impeach him is likely to have a spillover effect, suggesting to factfinders 
that he likely committed the charged crime or is a bad person unworthy of 
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the stakes are always higher for a criminal defendant than for 
the prosecution at trial.  It provides a more stringent balancing 
test for judges than would otherwise be available under a Rule 
403 analysis.200 
3.  Proposal 
I propose adding a third section, 404(c), to Rule 404.  This 
section would be entitled, “Character Evidence to Determine 
First Aggressor in Self-Defense Cases.”  The proposed rule 
would not amend any of the language currently in Rule 
404(a)(1) or 405; Rule 404(c) would serve as an exception to 
those rules in self-defense cases only, not a replacement for them 
under all circumstances.  The proposed text is as follows: 
 (c) Character Evidence to Determine First Aggressor in 
Self-Defense Cases 
 
 (1) Where character evidence would be probative in 
determining the identity of the first aggressor in a homicide 
or assault case where the defense of self-defense has been 
raised, evidence of factually relevant, reliable evidence of 
the alleged victim’s character for turbulence, aggression, or 
violence may be admitted by the accused, and may be 
considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is 
relevant.  The accused may use opinion testimony, 
reputation testimony, or specific instances of conduct to 
prove the alleged victim’s character.  If the accused admits 
evidence under this section, evidence tending to show the 
same character trait of the accused shall be admissible if 
offered by the prosecution, provided that the evidence is (i) 
relevant to determining the identity of the first aggressor, 
and (ii) more probative than unfairly prejudicial to the 
accused.  The prosecution may use opinion testimony, 
reputation testimony, or specific instances of conduct and is 
not limited by the method of proof chosen by the defendant. 
 (2) A party intending to offer evidence under subdivision 
(1) must 
 (A) file a written motion at least 14 days before trial 
specifically describing the specific acts and stating the 
purpose for which they will be admitted, unless the 
court, for good cause requires a different time for filing 
 
sympathy, which raises the possibility of angry or emotional reaction or 
misuse of the conviction as evidence of guilt. 
MUELLER & KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, § 6.31, at 496. 
200 Compare FED. R. EVID. 609(a), with FED. R. EVID. 403. 
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or permits filing during the trial; and 
 (B) serve the motion on all parties and notify the 
alleged victim or, when appropriate, representatives of 
the alleged victim’s estate. 
 (3) Before admitting evidence under this rule the court 
must conduct a hearing to determine the probative value of 
the evidence in determining the identity of the first 
aggressor, whether the evidence is factually relevant and 
reliable, and whether, in the case of evidence intended to be 
offered against the accused, the evidence is more probative 
than unfairly prejudicial to the defendant. 
I suggest that this amendment to the rule strikes a better 
balance between the interests of the prosecution and the 
defense.  While maintaining the defendant’s traditional hold on 
the key to character evidence at trial, the new rule requires 
pretrial notice and a hearing to eliminate surprise, avoid 
unnecessary collateral issues, and ensure that character evidence 
issues do not turn the trial into a circus.  The new rule also 
maximizes the jury’s ability to identify the probable first 
aggressor in a self-defense case by permitting the introduction of 
specific-acts character evidence. 
III 
EVALUATING CHARACTER EVIDENCE ALTERNATIVES IN 
SELF-DEFENSE CASES:  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RULE 
404(a)(1) AND PROPOSED RULE 404(c) 
In this section, I propose a two-part test for evaluating 
character evidence rules in self-defense cases where the identity 
of the first aggressor is at issue.  I then apply the test to three 
hypothetical case studies, evaluating in turn Rule 404(a)(1) and 
the proposed Rule 404(c).  I conclude that Rule 404(c) best 
balances the interests of the jury, the prosecution, and the 
defense in most cases. 
A.  Proposed Methodology for Testing Character Rules in Self-
Defense Cases 
Character evidence rules in self-defense cases should meet 
two criteria.  First, the rule should assist the jury in identifying 
the probable first aggressor in a violent encounter.  Second, the 
rule should permit the criminal defendant to mount a 
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meaningful defense.  I will discuss each element of the test in 
turn. 
The first criteria is that the rule assists the jury in identifying 
the probable first aggressor.  It is important to remember that 
self-defense cases typically involve a fast-moving situation, 
confusing facts, and the absence of clear-cut evidence as to who 
started the fight.201  The underlying philosophy of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence is that in most circumstances, the jury is 
entitled to hear as much relevant evidence as possible in a 
case.202  As mentioned previously, traditional evidentiary sources 
such as eyewitness testimony or forensic evidence may be of 
limited value to the jury in identifying the first aggressor in a 
self-defense case.203  Properly used, character evidence can help 
a jury overcome the limitations of other forms of evidence.204  
The key aspect of this element is the method of proof permitted 
to show character.  In descending order of significance, available 
methods of proof include specific acts of conduct, reputation 
testimony, and opinion testimony.205  A rule that precludes a 
particular method of proof may deprive the jury of significant 
information that would enable it to make the best possible 
decision. 
The second criteria is that the rule permits the defendant to 
mount a meaningful defense.206  Character evidence is a slender 
reed indeed upon which to support a defense, but in some 
circumstances, it may be the only method available to a 
defendant.  If supported by the facts, even the defendant of 
violent character is entitled to claim self-defense.  A rule that 
effectively precludes defendants from raising a meritorious, 
meaningful defense is problematic. 
The next section will use this two-part test to evaluate 
character evidence rules as applied to three hypothetical case 
studies.  Although hypothetical case studies can never capture 
the nuances and factual possibilities of actual cases, they can, 
 
201 See generally supra Part I.A. 
202 See FED. R. EVID. 401; FED. R. EVID. 402; see also supra notes 115–17 and 
accompanying text. 
203 See supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
205 See supra Part. I.B.4.a. 
206 Cf. supra notes 133–142 and accompanying text. 
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nonetheless, prove useful in examining the extreme limits of a 
rule’s application. 
B.  Assessing the Character Evidence Rules:  Three Hypothetical 
Case Studies 
1.  Peaceful Defendant, Violent Victim 
Paul is a clergyman who enjoys a reputation in the community 
as a peaceful person.  During a walk through the bad side of 
town, Paul becomes involved in a doctrinal argument with Terry, 
a local hoodlum, drug dealer, and self-anointed sidewalk 
preacher.  Terry has a reputation for violence in his 
neighborhood, although Paul does not know this at the time of 
their encounter.  Angry at Terry’s interpretation of the Sermon 
on the Mount, Paul draws his .44 magnum handgun and shoots 
Terry, killing him.  There are no eyewitnesses.  Several weeks 
after the incident, Paul learns for the first time about Terry’s 
reputation for violence in his neighborhood.  Terry earned this 
reputation by slapping around a series of his live-in girlfriends 
while intoxicated.  Paul is charged with second-degree murder.  
At trial, he wants to raise the defense of self-defense. 
a.  Current Federal Character Rules 
The current federal character rules permit Paul to mount a 
virtually unimpeachable defense.  First, the common law mercy 
rule, embodied in Rule 404(a)(1), allows Paul to introduce 
evidence of his peaceful character to raise reasonable doubt that 
he would be the first aggressor.207  Second, Rules 404(a)(2) and 
405 permit Paul to introduce evidence of Terry’s reputation for 
violence to suggest that Terry was the first aggressor in the 
case.208  With no real opportunity for rebuttal by the prosecution, 
the jury is likely to take note that a peaceful man had to defend 
himself against a bad man.  Weighing the probabilities based 
solely on character evidence, the jury may conclude that Terry 
was the first aggressor and acquit Paul. 
 
207 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
208 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2) (permitting the defendant to attack the victim’s 
character); FED. R. EVID. 405 (requiring the use of reputation or opinion 
testimony). 
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The current rules permit the defendant to raise an effective 
defense at trial, but they do so at the cost of the truth.  The 
unimpeachable combination of the defendant’s peaceful 
character and the victim’s violent character ensure that the 
character evidence rules will actually inhibit the jury’s ability to 
determine the truth.  By oversimplifying Terry’s aggressive 
tendencies through the lens of reputation evidence,209 Paul is 
able to gloss over the differences between the type of violence 
that fueled Terry’s reputation (alcohol-induced abuse of 
household members) and the type of aggression that would 
cause one man to initiate a violent encounter with a stranger. 
While it is true that Rule 405 would allow the prosecutor to 
cross-examine witnesses concerning Terry’s specific violent acts 
to establish that they are different in nature from the case at 
hand,210 the incentives for such an examination are low.  First, 
the prosecution risks buttressing the defendant’s claim of self-
defense by emphasizing Terry’s violent character; the jury may 
not understand the subtle differences in aggression between 
picking a fight with a total stranger and using violence in 
domestic altercations.  Second, the cross-examination could 
convince the jury that Terry, regardless of whether he started the 
altercation with Paul, is a bad man who got what he deserved in 
the end. 
b.  Proposed Rule 404(c) 
At trial, Rule 404(c) would work in concert with the existing 
character evidence rules as follows.  First, Pastor Paul would be 
entitled under Rule 404(a)(1) to raise his reputation for 
peacefulness in his own defense.211  Because his character in this 
respect is unimpeachable, the prosecution will have no rebuttal.  
This is where Rule 404(c) would come into play.  If Pastor Paul 
wants to suggest the probability of Tough Terry as the first 
aggressor, Rule 404(c) requires him to provide notice to the 
court and the prosecution.212  His evidence must survive a 
 
209 Cf. supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. 
210 See FED. R. EVID. 405 (“On cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into 
relevant specific instances of conduct.”). 
211 See id. 
212 See supra Part II.B.3. 
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hearing to determine its relevance and reliability.213  The 
likelihood of Pastor Paul’s evidence surviving the hearing is 
quite low.  While marginally relevant, the evidence tends to 
prove only that Terry is violent towards weak members of his 
immediate household, not towards strangers on the street. 
In this scenario, Rule 404(c) meets both elements of the test:  
it assists the jury in making a more accurate determination of the 
probable first aggressor in the case, and it preserves the ability of 
the defendant to present a meaningful defense.  Rule 404(c) 
permits the jury to more accurately determine the probable first 
aggressor in this case by shielding them from misleading 
evidence about Terry’s character.  The requirement for notice 
and a hearing precludes Pastor Paul from introducing potentially 
misleading evidence about the defendant’s character. 
Pastor Paul is still able to present a meaningful defense.  He 
can testify in his own case and has the significant benefit of being 
able to raise his own good character under Rule 404(a)(1). 
2.  Equally Violent Defendant and Victim 
Dan and Vinny are members of rival street gangs in their city.  
In their long careers of crime, both of them have committed an 
astonishing variety of violent acts:  robberies, assaults, attacks on 
other gang members, and the like.  Although the two men are 
strangers to each other, they meet by chance in an isolated 
section of a public park while walking their dogs.  No one else is 
in the area.  Vinny identifies Dan as a rival gang member by his 
clothing.  Bound by oath to extinguish all members of the rival 
gang, Vinny raises his TEC-9 submachine gun and fires a burst at 
Dan.  Luckily for Dan, Vinny misses.  Before Vinny can fire a 
second burst, Dan, a much better shot, fires a burst from his own 
automatic weapon and cuts Vinny down.  Vinny’s dying act is to 
fire another wild burst in Dan’s direction that hits and kills 
Dan’s dog.  The sound of gunfire draws the police to the area, 
where they find Dan cradling his dead dog in his arms, with 
Vinny lying in a pool of blood not far away.  Dan is charged with 
the murder of Vinny.  Dan wants to claim self-defense at trial, 
but his task is complicated by the presence of a dead victim and 
the absence of eyewitnesses. 
 
213 See supra Part II.B.3. 
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a.  Current Federal Character Rules 
Before Dan ever gets to raise a defense of any sort, the 
prosecution will be able to present specific-acts evidence against 
him under Rule 404(b).214  Under the facts of this case, the 
prosecution will most likely be able to introduce evidence of 
prior assaults against other members of the rival gang to prove 
motive or intent.215  There is some danger to Dan that the jury 
will misuse this evidence to conclude that Dan has character 
traits of violence and aggression, in spite of the judge’s limiting 
instructions to the contrary.216 
The rules permit Dan to introduce reputation or opinion 
testimony of Vinny’s reputation for violence to establish the 
likelihood that Vinny was the first aggressor under Rule 
404(a)(2).217  The prosecution is unlikely to cross-examine the 
defense witnesses regarding Vinny’s specific acts because those 
acts are violent and would likely support Dan’s contention that 
Vinny was the aggressor.218  Once Dan introduces reputation or 
opinion evidence of Vinny’s violent behavior, Rule 404(a)(1) 
allows the prosecution to rebut with reputation or opinion 
evidence of Dan’s violent behavior.219  As far as the jury is 
concerned, the reputation or opinion evidence will probably be a 
wash, telling them nothing more than that two violent people 
fired assault weapons at each other and one of them died. 
The current federal character rules fail both elements of the 
two-part test.  First, the character evidence rules interfere with 
the jury’s task to decide the probable first aggressor in this case; 
in fact, the rules suggest the wrong answer.  We know the first 
aggressor was Vinny.  The combination of specific-acts evidence 
under 404(b) and character evidence under 404(a)(1) may 
convince the jury, however, that Dan was the first aggressor. 
 
214 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b) (permitting the introduction of other crimes, 
wrongs, or acts in order to show “proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident”). 
215 See id. 
216 See supra notes 129–132 and accompanying text. 
217 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). 
218 This is because cross-examination based on specific acts depends heavily on 
the party’s incentives.  See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
219 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
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Second, the current character evidence rules interfere with 
Dan’s ability to raise an effective defense.  Dan’s inability to 
present specific-acts evidence against Vinny places him at a 
severe disadvantage to the prosecution, which is able to use Rule 
404(b) to introduce evidence of defendant Dan’s specific acts of 
violence.  After weighing the costs of attacking Vinny’s character 
under Rule 404(a)(2)–a prosecutorial counterattack 
emphasizing Dan’s bad character–Dan may well decide to 
forego introducing evidence that Vinny has a character for 
violence. 
b.  Proposed Rule 404(c) 
Rule 404(c), by providing additional flexibility in methods of 
proof to the defendant, potentially equalizes the advantages that 
Rule 404(b) confers on the prosecution in this case.  Upon notice 
and a hearing, Rule 404(c) would permit Dan to introduce 
specific instances of Vinny’s prior gang-related acts of 
violence.220  Although a Rule 404(c) hearing would most likely 
find Dan’s violent character relevant and reliable at trial, the 
rule’s enhanced balancing test grants a trial judge the flexibility 
to preclude the introduction of character evidence pertaining to 
Dan unless it would be more probative than prejudicial to 
Dan.221  In other words, a judge could preclude the prosecution 
from attacking Dan’s character for violence based on the 
tendency of that evidence to prejudice Dan’s ability to mount an 
effective defense. 
In this hypothetical scenario, Rule 404(c) enhances the jury’s 
ability to determine the probable first aggressor even as it allows 
the defendant to present a meaningful defense.  The jury will 
likely make a better decision regarding the probable first 
aggressor because it will be able to consider specific-acts 
evidence pertaining to both the defendant and the victim.222 
Of course, Rule 404(c) cannot guarantee a correct outcome in 
this case.  Given that both parties have violent pasts, there is an 
equal likelihood that either Dan or Vinny could be the first 
aggressor based on character evidence alone.  Nonetheless, Rule 
404(c) gives the jury access to specific-acts evidence about the 
 
220 See supra Part II.B.3. 
221 See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra Part I.B.4.a. 
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victim that would not have been available to it under the current 
version of the Federal Rules of Evidence.  The jury’s ability to 
reach a factually correct decision in this case is greater under 
Rule 404(c) than under the current character evidence rules. 
Dan is able to present a meaningful defense in this case.  
There are two primary reasons for this.  First, he is able to 
choose which type of character evidence to present at trial, 
rather than being hamstrung by the reputation and opinion 
constraints of Rule 405.  Second, Dan can potentially persuade a 
judge that the prosecution’s introduction of character evidence 
against him would be more prejudicial than probative.223 
3.  Factually Distinct Bases for Violent Character of Defendant 
and Victim 
To illustrate this application of the character evidence rules, 
we return to the hypothetical situation used in the introduction 
to this Article.224  In this hypothetical, Debbie, a call girl, defends 
herself against the violent advances of Victor, a customer.  She 
stabs Victor to death as he is lunging across the bed to attack her 
with a chair. 
Debbie and Victor both have reputations “for violence” 
within their respective communities.  Debbie has a hot temper 
and has committed a number of petty assaults against co-
workers and members of her household.  She once kicked a 
police officer in the kneecap while being arrested.  Victor, in 
contrast, has committed several acts of sex-related violence 
against women.  Specifically, each of Victor’s violent acts was 
preceded by a rejected demand for a particular type of sexual 
activity.  Debbie’s defense attorney learns about these incidents 
while preparing for trial and seeks to use them as evidence of 
Victor’s propensity for violence to suggest that Victor was the 
aggressor in his fatal encounter with Debbie. 
a.  Current Federal Character Rules 
Under Rule 404(a)(2), Debbie can introduce reputation and 
opinion testimony regarding Victor’s violence if it is available,225 
 
223 See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. 
224 See generally supra Introduction (pp. 735–36). 
225 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2). 
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but Rule 405 precludes her from using specific-acts evidence.226  
The prosecution is permitted to respond to Debbie’s attack on 
Victor under Rule 404(a)(1) by introducing reputation and 
opinion testimony to the effect that Debbie “is violent.”227  
Debbie’s attorney can cross-examine the prosecution witnesses 
under Rule 405 regarding the specific acts of violence Debbie 
committed,228 attempting to differentiate them from the 
stabbing.  This cross-examination is likely to be risky and 
ineffective, eliciting only that Debbie started several physical 
fights against coworkers but did not use weapons.229  In the end, 
the false equivalence created by the combination of Rules 
404(a)(1) and 405 may suggest to the jury that Debbie and 
Victor are equally violent.230  Faced with the unfortunate reality 
of a dead victim, Debbie can only hope to prevail at trial if she 
testifies and the jury believes her story. 
Under this hypothetical scenario, the current federal character 
rules again fail both prongs of the test.  First, the rules are not 
particularly helpful to the jury in determining the truth.  Unless 
the jury is inclined to believe Debbie’s testimony, the rules 
create a nearly insurmountable obstacle to discovering the truth.  
This is because under Rule 405, Debbie is unable to use the 
highly probative evidence of Victor’s specific acts to suggest the 
likelihood that he initiated the violent encounter.  In fact, 
because Rule 404(a)(1) allows the prosecution to respond to 
Debbie’s evidence by introducing broadly categorized reputation 
and opinion testimony that essentially equalizes her petty 
violence with Victor’s specific acts of sexually oriented violence, 
the rules interfere with the search for the first aggressor.  The 
rules do not permit Debbie to mislead the jury regarding her 
own character, but they do allow the prosecution to create a 
misleading equivalence between her character and Victor’s by 
countering his “reputation for violence” with her “reputation for 
violence.”231  The distinct factual differences that led to the two 
reputations will never be heard by the jury.232  Those factual 
 
226 See FED. R. EVID. 405. 
227 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1). 
228 See FED. R. EVID. 405(a). 
229 See supra notes 95–96 and accompanying text. 
230 Cf. supra notes 86–94 and accompanying text. 
231 See FED. R. EVID. 404(a), 404(a)(1). 
232 Cf. id. 
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distinctions could make all the difference in a close self-defense 
case. 
Second, the rules effectively prevent Debbie from presenting 
a meaningful defense at trial.  Knowing she will pay a very 
personal price for bringing Victor’s character into question, she 
may opt not to mention it at all and hope the jury simply 
believes her side of the story.  In an instance where character 
evidence, properly characterized and accurately presented, 
would be particularly useful in helping the jury determine the 
first aggressor, she is, in essence, denied its use. 
b.  Proposed Rule 404(c) 
Rule 404(c) would permit Debbie to introduce specific 
instances of conduct to prove Victor’s violent character.  In 
order to respond with evidence of Debbie’s violent character, 
the prosecution would have to prove that its evidence is (1) 
factually relevant, (2) reliable, and (3) more probative than 
prejudicial.  This effort is likely to fail, because Debbie’s 
reputation for violence stems from petty assaults against co-
workers, a far cry from Victor’s sexually oriented, serious acts of 
violence against women.233  Thus, the prosecution will not be 
able to present a false equivalence of “reputation for violence” 
versus “reputation for violence” in this case. 
In this scenario, Rule 404(c) assists the jury in identifying the 
probable first aggressor in several ways.  First, the rule permits 
the jury to hear evidence of Victor’s specific acts of violent 
conduct, the strongest available character evidence.  Second, the 
rule eliminates Debbie’s unrelated prior acts of violence at trial, 
thereby enhancing the ability of the jury to determine the first 
aggressor in this case.  Third, the rule prohibits either side from 
misleading the jury. 
The rule also supports the defendant’s ability to present a 
meaningful defense.  Debbie is able to affirmatively introduce 
evidence of the victim’s specific acts to prove his character, yet 
preclude the introduction of evidence of her unrelated but 
potentially prejudicial reputation for violence and aggression.  
The current rules’ perverse incentive to remain silent in order to 
avoid a misleading character counterattack disappears. 
 
233 See supra Part II.B.3. 
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C.  Summary 
Rule 404(c) offers an improvement over current character 
evidence rules in a variety of self-defense cases.  When the 
defendant of good or neutral character for violence seeks to 
make a character attack on the victim for unrelated types of 
violence, Rule 404(c)’s notice and hearing requirement will 
prohibit the introduction of the evidence.  When a defendant 
and victim of approximately equal violent character encounter 
each other, Rule 404(c)’s allowance of specific-acts character 
evidence permits the defendant to equalize the prosecutorial 
advantage conferred by Rule 404(b).  The rule also enhances the 
jury’s ability to find the truth by ensuring the jury receives more 
of the information that will be most valuable to it in making its 
decision. 
Rule 404(c)’s greatest benefit comes in cases where a 
defendant’s past acts of violence are unrelated to the case at 
hand, but the alleged victim’s past acts of violence are very 
similar to the case at hand.  The current rules mandate an 
artificial presentation of character traits that prevents the 
defendant from showing the jury why the victim was the likely 
first aggressor in this encounter.  In essence, the current rules 
conflate different types of violence under broad categories, 
creating the potential for injustice in application.  Rule 404(c) 
eliminates the problem of false equivalence of character traits 
posed by the current rules.  First, Rule 404(c) requires a hearing 
to determine the relevance and reliability of character evidence 
in self-defense cases; this hearing gives the judge the opportunity 
to filter out violence that is unrelated to the case at hand.  
Second, Rule 404(c) allows the parties to use evidence of specific 
instances of conduct, a stronger and more accurate method of 
proving character. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Character evidence can play a critical role in helping the jury 
determine the probable first aggressor in homicide and assault 
cases.  In the absence of eyewitness testimony or supporting 
forensic evidence, character evidence can make or break a 
defendant’s ability to claim self-defense at trial. 
Current character evidence rules may interfere both with the 
jury’s ability to determine the probable first aggressor and with 
 2007] Character Evidence and Self-Defense in Homicide and Assault Cases 795 
the defendant’s opportunity to present a meaningful defense.  By 
prohibiting the introduction of specific instances of conduct, 
current character rules deprive the jury of the strongest and 
clearest tool for determining character.  The exclusive use of 
reputation and opinion testimony also interferes with the 
defendant’s ability to distinguish his own character for violence 
from that of the victim; reputation and opinion testimony lump 
past acts of violence into broad character categories that have 
the potential to create misleading equivalencies for very 
different types of underlying violence.  Finally, the majority of 
American jurisdictions permit the defendant to introduce 
evidence of the alleged victim’s character for violence, yet 
prohibit the prosecution from rebutting with evidence of the 
defendant’s character for violence.  This one-sided presentation 
of character evidence has the potential to mislead the jury into 
believing that the victim was violent, but the defendant was 
peaceful. 
The 2000 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)(1) 
eliminated the defendant’s ability to attack the victim’s character 
with impunity.  The amendment did not, however, solve the 
problems created in self-defense cases by the exclusive use of 
reputation or opinion testimony.  Furthermore, the amendment 
degraded the defendant’s ability to claim self-defense at trial. 
The proposed Rule 404(c) will help solve the shortcomings of 
the federal character evidence rules and those rules currently 
used by the majority of American jurisdictions.  The proposed 
rule, which applies exclusively to self-defense cases, has several 
key elements:  (1) it preserves the defendant’s historic control 
over the introduction of character evidence; (2) it permits the 
use of evidence of specific instances of conduct to prove 
character; (3) it allows the prosecution to rebut defense attacks 
on the victim’s character, provided that the evidence is more 
probative than prejudicial to the defendant; and (4) by requiring 
notice and a hearing, it ensures that only reliable evidence that is 
relevant to a self-defense case is introduced at trial.  Adoption of 
the rule will help the jury in its task of determining the probable 
first aggressor in a self-defense case, even as it preserves the 
ability of the defendant to mount an effective defense. 
 
 796 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86, 733 
 
